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Welfare Administration and the Rights
of Welfare Recipients
By LIsE A. PEARLMAN*
A society that sacrifices the health and well-being of its [indigent]
young upon the false altar of economy endangers its own future,
and, indeed, its own survival.,
- Mathew 0. Tobriner
During his tenure on the California Supreme Court,2 Mathew
Tobriner has had the opportunity to fashion significant new law ex-
panding the rights of the poor. In addition to writing seminal opinions
in Randone v. Appellate Department,3 in which the court struck down
California's prejudgment attachment laws as violative of the procedural
due process guarantees of the state and federal constitutions, and Green
v. Superior Court,4 in which the court recognized an implied warranty
of habitability as a defense to an unlawful detainer action, Justice
Tobriner has made a substantial contribution to the evolution of the
law in the highly controversial area of welfare administration. In
contrast to Randone and Green, which imposed limitations on the avail-
ability of remedies to private individuals such as creditors and land-
lords, the decisions treated herein involve controversies between the
poor and the state, legal battles in which Justice Tobriner has emerged
* B.A., 1971, Yale University; J.D., 1974, University of California at Berkeley.
Member, California Bar. Extern for Justice Tobriner, Fall, 1973. Associate, Start,
Stewart, Simon & Sparrowe, Oakland, California.
1. Cooper v. Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 856, 872-73, 524 P.2d 97, 107, 115 Cal. Rptr.
1, 11 (1974).
2. Justice Tobriner was elevated to the California Supreme Court from Division
One of the First Appellate District on July 10, 1962, to fill the vacancy left by re-
tiring Justice Maurice Dooling.
3. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
4. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
5. The year before his appointment to the California Supreme Court, Justice
Tobriner had authored an opinion upholding a state regulation against a due process
challenge on the ground, inter alia, that the recipient possessed no "vested right" to
aid. Cox v. State Social Welfare Bd., 193 Cal. App. 2d 708, 14 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1st
Dist. 1961) (Old Age Security (OAS) applicant denied benefits for failure to exhaust
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as the strongest and most steadfast advocate of the rights of the poor
on the California Supreme Court.6
Background
Judicial articulation of the rights of the needy takes place in a
legal framework that is unusual, if not unique. Present day public
assistance law is the product of a complex interaction of federal and
state statutes and administrative regulations. Participation by states
in federally funded welfare programs is voluntary, and each state is
at liberty to determine its own level of funding, but a state can qualify
for receipt of federal monies only if it complies with applicable federal
statutes and HEW regulations.7  Within each state, administrative
regulations must comport with the state statutory scheme, and both
the regulations and statutory provisions must be consistent with the
controlling federal law.s Superimposed on this structure are consti-
tutional considerations - the preservation of fundamental rights and
equal protection and due process guarantees.
Coloring the entire framework is the historical reality that the
enactment and implementation of public assistance programs have
been highly dependent upon the socioeconomic and political context
in which they have taken shape. Until recent years, the contours of
potential resources in the form of his wife's right to apply for social security bene-
fits). Because, as a justice on an intermediate court he was of necessity following
the dictates of the state and federal supreme courts that had thus far refused to rec-
ognize any vested right to public assistance, it would be futile to attempt to divine
from Cox the values then held by its author. Cox has therefore not been included
in the discussion that follows.
6. This conclusion is not meant to imply that other justices had not spoken out
against invidious treatment of public assistance recipients before Justice Tobriner was
appointed to the supreme court. See, for example, the dissenting opinion of Justice
Peters, joined by Justice Dooling in People v. Shirley, 55 Cal. 2d 521, 536, 360 P.2d
33, 36, 11 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540 (1961). Nonetheless, until the late sixties there was
little judicial activity in this area. Justice Peters, an early advocate of the poor, sat
on the court when welfare issues were first being litigated, but his death in January
of 1973 prevented his participation in more than a handful of such decisions, of which
he authored only one, a unanimous decision holding that plaintiffs' class of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients had stated a cause of action
against the county upon allegations that the county conditioned aid to said families
upon the participation of children under the age of 12 in agricultural work. Ramos
v. County of Madera, 4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1971).
7. See Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397 (1970).
8. See Conover v. Hall, 11 Cal. 3d 842, 847-49, 523 P.2d 682, 684-85, 114
Cal. Rptr. 642, 644-45 (1974); County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 738-39,
488 P.2d 953, 959, 97 Cal. Rptr. 385, 391 (1971).
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such programs have been molded almost exclusively by the legislative
and executive branches of our government. The judiciary entered
the field late, but its impact has been dramatic.
The Changing National Perspective on Poverty
Until the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of 19649 as
part of President Johnson's war on poverty, the nation's poor had
virtually no access to legal representation. 10 This lack of effective
representation was symptomatic of their plight. From its inception,
the Anglo-American practice of providing public relief for the destitute
has been imbued with the attitude that "beggars can't be choosers.""
The principle of public responsibility for the poor was firmly
established four centuries ago by the Elizabethan Poor Law.' 2  Since
then, public assistance programs have traditionally been locally ad-
ministered 3 with few if any guidelines, other than an overwhelming
concern for minimizing the cost of the public undertaking. 4  Unfor-
tunately this has all too often operated at the expense of dehumanizing
the poor.' 5 Throughout early American history, paupers were often
treated much like criminal fugitives:' 6 they could be forced to wear
insignia of poverty, their movement could be restricted, they could
be involuntarily confined in poor houses or jails, and they could be
denied the right to vote.17  In 1837 in Mayor of New York v. Miln,'8
9. Aug. 20, 1964, P.L. 88-452, § 2, 78 Stat. 508 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
10. Sitkin, Welfare Law in California, 1970 CAL. LAW 559, 561 (Bancroft-Whit-
ney 1970) [hereinafter cited as Welfare Law].
11. See Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 407,
414-42 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Bendich].
12. 43 Eliz. 1, ch. 2, § VII (1601). See tenBroek, California's Dual System of
Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status (pts. 1-3), 16 STAN. L. REv.
(pt. 1) 257, (pt. 2) 900 (1964), 17 STAN. L. REv. (pt. 3) 614 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as California's Dual System of Family Law].
13. See California's Dual System of Family Law, supra note 12, at 292-93.
14. Id. at 286-87. Until about the middle of the nineteenth century, welfare
consisted primarily of various forms of poor relief administered and financed under
private auspices ox by cities or counties under laws that placed a vaguely defined
responsibility upon the legal subdivision. Generally, there were no standards as to
either content or amount of aid and no concept of right; qualification for relief rested
upon complete destitution and lack of any relative to charge with support. Id. at
293-98.
15. See Diamond, The Children of Leviathan: Psychoanalytic Speculations Con-
cerning Welfare Law and Punitive Sanctions, 54 CALIF. L. ftv. 357 (1966).
16. See Bendich, supra note 11, at 416.
17. Id. at 435 n.78.
18. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142 (1837).
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the United States Supreme Court referred to paupers as a "moral pesti-
lence" in upholding the right of the State of New York to exclude them
from its borders. The Court did not reverse this holding and reject
its prior equation of poverty with immorality until more than a century
later in the landmark case of Edwards v. California,19 which invalidated
a similar California law.
Between the last half of the nineteenth century and the Depres-
sion, a phenomenon began to appear that has been broadly charac-
terized as the growth of "preferential assistance." 20 This phenomenon
was the result of a growing belief that "while the poor as a class
were [to be] generally distrusted . . . some poor persons were
'worthy' in that their poverty was 'no fault of their own,' or be-
cause there seemed to be evidence that they had the capacity for
'moral regeneration' . . . . [T]he almshouse with its deterrent
and punitive features would be the only recourse of all others
who professed to be in need."21
This concept of "worthy" and "unworthy" poor has continued to
have great influence on the formulation and implementation of public
assistance programs, including California's present system.
The widespread unemployment of the Depression exposed the
inadequacies of localized public assistance and motivated Congress
to undertake the first large-scale national benefit program in American
history, the Social Security Act of 1935,22 "to supplement the tradi-
tional . . . system for distributing income to certain disadvantaged
persons."23  Congress passed the Act with the clear intention that
"categorical programs were to be controlled and guided primarily by
local fiscal commitment rather than by concepts of need and basic
entitlements .... "24 Although the Act was not conceived as a com-
prehensive or integrated public welfare system, 25 it nevertheless rep-
resented "the sharpest break with previously existing patterns of
welfare administration" that the country had ever experienced .2  The
19. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
20. Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 326,
327 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Wedemeyer & Moore].
21. Id. at 327 (citing LEYENDECKER, PROBLEMS AND POLICY IN PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
46 (1955)).
22. Ch. 368, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
23. Wedemeyer & Moore, supra note 20, at 326.
24. Id. at 346.
25. Id. at 329.
26. Id. at 326. The impact of the Social Security Act of 1935 has been at-
tributed to the fact that it marked the "entrance of the federal government into a
role of continuing direct responsibility for the care of needy people" and the estab-
lishment of "the individual's immediate welfare as a matter of national concern en-
titled to consideration in the deployment of national resources." Id. at 347.
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Act's imposition of conditions that the states had to meet in order to
receive federal matching grants27 marked a significant change in public
welfare programming.
28
Edwards v. California9 was decided six years after the passage of
the Social Security program. Although it demonstrated the marked
change in attitude of the Court in the century since the Miln view of
paupers as a "moral pestilence,"3o it by no means unequivocally as-
sured that the Court would scrutinize and strike down other iniquitous
burdens placed by states upon the poor. Edwards was a unanimous
decision, but the justices were sharply divided on the rationale of the
holding. A bare majority decided the case on the basis that Califor-
nia's exclusion of indigents from its borders interfered with interstate
commerce. 81 They characterized the issue as one of federal preemp-
tion rather than of individual rights. The concurring justices, on the
other hand, would have invalidated the statute as an impermissible in-
fringement of the national privileges and immunities extended to
United States citizens by the fourteenth amendment.
82
The majority's commerce clause rationale did little to improve
prior notions of the second-class citizenship of the poor. Although
in dicta the Court approved the partial shift of responsibility for the
needy from the states to the federal government that Congress sought
to achieve under the Social Security Act,33 Edwards reemphasized
governmental preoccupation with the economic aspects of poverty
relief and left untouched the notion that such relief was essentially
a discretionary act of government largesse, albeit no longer purely
local.
27. The Secretary of the Treasury was empowered to withhold benefits from a
nonconforming state. 49 Stat. 628 (1935), 42 U.S.C. §§ 603-04 (1958). See notes
7-8 & accompanying text supra.
28. Such conditions have increased dramatically since the enactment of the first
Social Security Act. See discussion in Wedemeyer & Moore, supra note 20, at 347-48.
29. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
30. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142 (1837). See text
accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
31. 314 U.S. at 173-74.
32. Justices Douglas and Jackson wrote separate concurring opinions, with Justices
Black and Murphy joining in Justice Douglas' concurrence. Although both concur-
rences would have invalidated the California statute under the privileges and im-
munities clause, Justice Douglas expressed no opinion as to the applicability of the
commerce clause, id. at 177-81, while Justice Jackson completely rejected the com-
merce clause rationale, id. at 181-82.
33. "[W]e are not now called upon to determine anything other than the pro-
priety of an attempt by a State to prohibit the transportation of indigent non-residents
into its territory. The nature and extent of its obligation to afford relief to new-
comers is not here involved. We do, however, suggest that the theory of the Eliza-
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The Changing California Perspective
Until recently, recipients of public assistance in California were
held to have "no vested rights" to receive aid.34  Their only right was
"to make application for benefits."3  Even if benefits were granted,
the administering agency had almost unfettered discretion to interpret
benefit provisions and process applications3 ' Ultimately, the legisla-
ture had unquestioned power to alter or eliminate the benefits.3 7
The traditional view of welfare benefits as charity dispensed at
the discretion of local agencies did not receive widespread criticism
until the mid-sixties. 8 Within the context of an increased awareness
of individual rights in society, the concept that welfare entitlement
should be a property right of the poor was articulated in a seminal
article by Professor Charles Reich of Yale. 9  In support of this argu-
ment, Reich pointed out the ever-increasing role of the government
in regulating the economy 40 and the growing recognition that the
poor are mainly poor not through any failure of their own but as a
result of societal forces beyond their control.
41
bethan poor laws no longer fits the facts. Recent years, and particularly the past
decade, have been marked by a growing recognition that in an industrial society the
task of providing assistance to the needy has ceased to be local in character. The
duty to share the burden, if not wholly to assume it, has been recognized not only
by State governments, but by the Federal government as well. The changed attitude
is reflected in the Social Security laws under which the Federal and State governments
cooperate for the care of the aged, the blind and dependent ...... Id. at 174-75.
34. Bertch v. Social Welfare Dep't, 45 Cal. 2d 524, 529, 289 P.2d 485, 489
(1955); Cox v. State Social Welfare Bd., 193 Cal. App. 2d 708, 718, 14 Cal. Rptr.
776, 781-82 (1st Dist. 1961). Although the courts gradually shifted away from this
analysis, the explicit recognition of the continued receipt of aid as a vested right did
not come until the decision in Harlow v. Carleson, 16 Cal. 3d 731, 548 P.2d 698, 129
Cal. Rptr. 298 (1976). See notes 274-75 & accompanying text intra.
35. Bertch v. Social Welfare Dep't, 45 Cal. 2d at 529, 289 P.2d at 489.
36. See, e.g., Cox v. State Social Welfare Bd., 193 Cal. App. 2d 708, 718, 14
Cal. Rptr. 776, 782 (1st Dist. 1961).
37. See Miller, Race, Poverty, and the Law, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 386, 396-98
(1966).
38. See, e.g., Symposium: Law of the Poor, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 319 (1966).
39. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). But see Bendich,
supra note 11, at 437-42, arguing for recognition of welfare benefits as a constitutional
entitlement of the poor and criticizing commentators (such as Reich) who were urging
the characterization of welfare benefits as "mere property rights."
40. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255-56 (1965).
41. See, e.g., Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72
YALE L.J. 1347, 1359 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Midnight Welfare Searches]: "So-
cial security and public assistance are the heart of the welfare state. They recognize
that in a complex industrial society, individuals cannot always be 'blamed' for inability
[Vol. 29
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Another scholarly trailblazer was the prolific Jacobus tenBroek.42
Among his contributions was a comprehensive three-part history and
analysis of what he termed California's dual system of family law -
the double standard under which the poor were singled out from
the rest of society for invidious legal treatment.43  Professor ten-
Broek pointed out that a distinguishing characteristic of the family
law of the poor is the responsibility provisions by which specified per-
sons are placed under a legal duty to provide financial support for
their impoverished relations, which duty would not be imposed but
for the fact that the persons to whom the duty is owed are destitute.44
A prime example cited by Professor tenBroek was that, at the same
time that California had a longstanding common law and civil code
provision exempting a man from a duty to support the children of
his wife by a former husband,45 the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program (AFDC) imposed liability for child support upon
both a stepfather and an unrelated adult male acting in the role of
spouse (MARS) to an AFDC mother.46
AFDC was the acknowledged stepchild of the American welfare
system.47  As already mentioned, the late nineteenth century was
marked by the growth of preferential assistance to the "worthy." This
preference was effected by piecemeal reforms in some of the less con-
troversial public assistance programs.48  Prior to the 1960's, organized
political pressure had eliminated relative responsibility provisions in
California programs for the blind and disabled and had drastically
reduced them in programs for the aged.49  For the "less worthy" poor
to support themselves, and that responsibility for individual subsistence must be widely
shared ......
42. Early works include: tenBroek, California's Welfare Law - Origins and De-
velopment, 45 CALF. L. REv. 241 (1957); tenBroek, The Impact of Welfare Law
Upon Family Law, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 458 (1954). Later, he wrote California's Dual
System of Family Law, supra note 12, and co-authored tenBroek & Matson, The Dis-
abled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CALin. L. REv. 809 (1966).
43. California's Dual System of Family Law, supra note 12.
44. Id. at 628. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 206 (West 1972) (liability of parents for
needy adult children, and of children for needy adults).
45. CAL. CIV. CODE § 209 (West 1954) (current version at CAL. Crv. CODE § 209
(West Supp. 1977)).
46. California's Dual System of Family Law, supra note 12, at 654.
47. Wedemeyer & Moore, supra note 20, at 346. "So little importance was at-
tached to [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] by the congressional framers
that ... the Chairman of the Committee on Economic Security is quoted as saying,
'Nothing would have been done on this subject if it had not been included in the
report of the Committee." Id.
48. Id. at 326-29.
49. See Californias Dual System of Family Law, supra note 12, at 633-35.
September 1977]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
(AFDC and mentally disabled), relative responsibility provisions not
only continued but expanded. 50
As the judiciary became more actively engaged in the new "era
of advocacy," 51 it acquainted itself with the analyses and theories of
Reich and tenBroek. Effective representation for the poor lagged
several years behind scholars' exposition of their rights, however. Un-
til the last decade, welfare issues reached the California appellate
courts primarily in the context of interagency administrative disputes
52
or criminal convictions for welfare fraud.5a Rarely was a civil action
brought by an applicant or recipient challenging a denial or reduction
of welfare benefits.
54
The Judicial Turning Point: Close Scrutiny of Relative Responsibility
Laws
In 1964 the California Supreme Court took the first major judicial
step toward eradication of the iniquitous system of financing public
assistance programs. In Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirch-
ner,55 a unanimous opinion by Justice Schauer, the court held un-
constitutional a statute that allowed the state to recoup from "the
husband, wife, father, mother or children of a mentally ill person"
the cost of supporting that person as an inmate of a state hospital.56
The rationale of the case was somewhat muddled.57 Apparently,
the patient in this particular case had sufficient assets to pay for her
confinement. The state had not sought to reach her assets, but in-
stead had pursued the adult daughter for reimbursement. At one
point, Justice Schauer spoke of the irrationality of a statute imposing
50. Id. at 654.
51. Welfare Law, supra note 10, at 559, quoting a 1969 press statement of the
outgoing California State Welfare Director.
52. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Dep't of Social Welfare, 41 Cal. 2d 455,
260 P.2d 41 (1953); County of Contra Costa v. Social Welfare Bd., 229 Cal. App.
2d 762, 40 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1964); Merced County v. Dep't of Social Welfare, 148
Cal. App. 2d 540, 307 P.2d 46 (1957).
53. See, e.g., People v. Owens, 231 Cal. App. 2d 691, 42 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1965);
People v. Shirley, 55 Cal. 2d 521, 360 P.2d 33, 11 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1961).
54. An exception was Cox v. State Social Welfare Bd., 193 Cal. App. 2d 708,
14 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1961). See note 5 supra.
55. 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964), vacated, 380 U.S.
194 (1965), reiterated on state grounds, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr.
329 (1965).
56. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6650 (West 1954) (repealed 1967).
57. "The court's conclusion on the central problem is ...apocalyptic, unargued,
and unexplained, leaving the conclusion to stand on its intrinsic merits and the reader
to his own analysis." California's Dual System of Family Law, supra note 12, at 640.
(Vol. 29
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such an obligation upon the daughter without vesting in her any
right to recoup from the assets of the patient.58 At another point
he spoke more broadly of the denial of equal protection produced
by the inherent arbitrariness of charging the cost of confining persons
in state institutions to any one class in society if the purpose of the
confinement was the protection of society as a whole.59
The latter language regarding violation of basic equal protection
guarantees was cited by Professor tenBroek when he hailed Kirchner
as a landmark decision:
The importance of this decision cannot be overestimated; nor can
the holding be confined to the relatives of the mentally irrespon-
sible. The principle enunciated applies with equal force to the
relatives of other public aid recipients. If the public assumes
responsibility when mentally ill individuals are given care in state
hospitals, it equally assumes responsibility when needy individuals
are given public support in their own homes. That much was
determined by the first revolution in welfare as long ago as 1601.
Once the public has assumed the responsibility, the cost must be
derived from publicly apportioned taxation. It cannot be shifted
to private persons - not to relatives, nor friends, nor other arbi-
trarily selected persons in the community who happen to have
the money.10
Kirchner never accomplished the sweeping result that Professor ten-
Broek bad anticipated. The court has never gone as far as his broad
reading of the case suggests although, as the opinions discussed
herein reveal, Justice Tobriner has steadfastly clung to the principles
of Kirchner, reflected in Professor tenBroek's query:
In this age of a renewed quest for equality and a national redis-
covery of the human and moral elements in the Constitution,
should not poverty as a classifying trait be declared inherently
discriminatory and outlawed because of its very nature, and "the
mere fact of being without funds" be held "constitutionally an ir-
relevance like race, creed or color" . . . ?61
58. 60 Cal. 2d at 722, 388 P.2d at 724, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
59. Id. at 720, 388 P.2d at 722, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 490. After the United States
Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari and vacated the decision for a deter-
mination of whether it rested on an interpretation of the federal or state constitution,
id., vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 194 (1965), the California Supreme Court re-
affirmed its decision on the basis of both the California and federal constitutions, id.,
aff'd mem., 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965). Thus, the court
firmly proclaimed itself willing to intervene to enforce the constitution "[wlhere the
forces moving the political branches of government [were] absent, and where even-
handed justice and principles of equal treatment imperatively called for fulfill-
ment .... " Californids Dual System of Family Law, supra note 12, at 646.
60. Id. at 638-39.
61. Id. at 644 quoted in Swoap v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 490, 523-24, 516
P.2d 840, 863, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136, 159 (1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
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Constitutional Rights of Welfare Recipients
Justice Tobriner wholeheartedly agrees with Professor tenBroek.
He has demonstrated time and time again his commitment to protection
of the constitutional rights of persons receiving welfare. Although
his view has not always been accepted by all of his fellow justices,
as witnessed by his writing both majority and dissenting opinions,
nonetheless, he has succeeded in guiding the court toward a much
broader recognition of welfare recipients' rights.
Parrish v. Civil Service Commission
In 1966 the California Law Review undertook an ambitious sym-
posium on the law of the poor for the purpose, inter alia, of "providing
a foundation of thought, analysis, and scholarship for the use of ... the
courts in deciding cases.";2 During this time a case assaying this new
awareness of the rights of the poor was in the process of being ap-
pealed. Parrish v. Civil Service Cominission6 was an action brought
by a social worker seeking reinstatement to his job after having been
discharged for insubordination for declining to participate in a mass
morning raid upon the homes of Alameda County welfare recipients.
The raid, dubbed "Operation Bedcheck," was conducted for the os-
tensible purpose 64 of detecting the presence of unreported adult males
in violation of former Welfare and Institutions Code section 11351.
Such searches had become commonplace across the nation, proceeding
under the apparent theory that persons on public assistance impliedly
consented to the invasion of their bedrooms to assure the public that
their taxes were not being misspent on ineligible recipients.a
Parrish argued that the searches were illegal, thus justifying his
refusal to obey the order to participate in one of them. Although the
county subsequently abandoned the project and state and federal regu-
62. tenBroek, Preface to Symposium on the Law of the Poor, 54 CALIF. L. REv.
319, 319 (1966).
63. 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
64. The record indicated that the actual purpose, as articulated by the Alameda
County director, was to provide a dramatic public demonstration of the low incidence
of fraud in Alameda County by searching a random sample of recipients' homes. Id.
at 273-74, 425 P.2d at 232, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
65. See Midnight Welfare Searches, supra note 41, at 1359: "[M]ust the price of
state support be the erosion of self-respect ... ? ... To some public officials, open-
ing one's home to inspection evidently seems a reasonable condition to impose on those
whose homes are supported by a public agency." But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971). See note 79 & accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 29
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lations barred similar raids,60 the court was nonetheless compelled to
resolve the constitutionality of such mass raids in order to determine
Parrish's right of refusal at the time of his dismissal.67 Speaking for
the court, Justice Tobriner stated that, although the goal of reducing
welfare fraud was laudable, the manner in which the raid was carried
out violated the fourth amendment to the Constitution.
First, he concluded that the applicable constitutional standards
were those applied to searches for evidence of crime rather than those
applied to administrative searches, 6 because misrepresentation of wel-
fare eligibility is a crime.69 If the government uncovers criminal evi-
dence allegedly pursuant to a waiver of constitutional rights, the
government bears a heavy burden as to the supposed waiver. Ap-
parent consent can be vitiated by the threat of sanctions.70 In an-
alyzing the apparent consent secured by the searchers in "Operation
Bedcheck," Justice Tobriner concluded:
The persons subjected to the instant operation confronted
far more than the amorphous threat of official displeasure ....
The request for entry by persons whom the beneficiaries knew to
possess virtually unlimited power over their very livelihood posed
a threat which was far more certain, immediate, and substantial.
These circumstances nullify the legal effectiveness of the apparent
consent secured by the Alameda County searchers.
71
Second, Justice Tobriner reasoned that, regardless of whether
consent for the search had been obtained, the operation was predicated
on the unconstitutional assumption that the welfare agency had the
power to withdraw welfare benefits from anyone who refused to con-
sent. His analysis of this issue drew heavily upon the review of the
so-called "doctrine of unconstitutional conditions" in Bagley v. Wash-
ington Township Hospital District.72  Writing for the court in that
66. DEP'T OF SOCIAL WELFARaE, BULL. No. 624, SPECIAL METHODS OF INVESTI-
GATION § V(B) (revised ed., effective Sept. 1, 1963); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALT, EDU-
CATION AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADmINISTRATION §§ 2220
(item 1), 2230 (item 1) (1966).
67. 66 Cal. 2d at 262-63, 425 P.2d at 224-25, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25.
68. Id. at 265-67, 425 P.2d at 226-28, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 626-28.
69. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11265, 11482 (West 1954). In Parrish, Justice
Tobriner also refers in passing to the applicability of the general grand theft statutes,
CAL. PEN~AL CODE §§ 484, 487 (West 1954), 66 Cal. 2d at 265, 425 P.2d at 226, 57
Cal. Rptr. at 626, which the court soon thereafter declared inapplicable to welfare
fraud in People v. Gilbert, 1 Cal. 3d 475, 462 P.2d 580, 82 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1969).
See text accompanying note 83 infra.
70. 66 Cal. 2d at 268-69, 425 P.2d at 228-29, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 628-29.
71. Id. at 270, 425 P.2d at 229-30, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 629-30.
72. Bagley struck down, as violative of the first amendment, CAL. Gov'T CODE
September 1977]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
case, Justice Tobriner had declared that if the conditions appended
to the enjoyment of a publicly conferred benefit require a waiver of
rights secured by the Constitution, the governmental entity seeking
to impose those conditions must establish:
(1) that the conditions reasonably relate to the purposes sought
by the legislation which confers the benefit;
(2) that the value accruing to the public from imposition of those
conditions manifestly outweighs any resulting impairment of con-
stitutional rights; and
(3) that there are available no alternative means less subversive
of constitutional right, narrowly drawn so as to correlate more
closely with the purposes contemplated by conferring the benefit.73
Applying the Bagley test to "Operation Bedcheck," Justice To-
briner observed that the stated purpose was the detection of welfare
fraud. Yet this purpose was to be accomplished by a search of homes,
at least half of which were intentionally chosen at random from non-
suspect welfare cases.7 4  He concluded that such a poor correlation
between ends and means utterly failed to meet the third criterion of
Bagley: "[S]o striking is the disparity between the operation's de-
clared purpose and the means employed, so broad its gratuitous reach,
and so convincing the evidence that improper considerations dictated
its ultimate scope, that no valid link remains between that operation
and its proffered justification.", 5
In analyzing the issue of unconstitutional conditions in Parrish,
Justice Tobriner also implicitly relied on the newly articulated right
to privacy established by the United States Supreme Court in Griswold
v. Connecticut.7 Early in the opinion, he asserted the right of privacy
as a second constitutional question posed by the searches. 77  His anal-
§ 3205 (West 1966) (prohibiting political activities of public employees) (current
version at CAL. GOVT CODE § 3205 (West Supp. 1977)) and a hospital district di-
rective to its personnel pxoviding that employee participation in any local political
activity would constitute grounds for disciplinary action or dismissal. 65 Cal. 2d
499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966).
73. Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 271, 425 P.2d 223, 230-31.
57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 630-31 (1967), citing Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist.,
65 Cal. 2d 499, 501-02, 505-08, 421 P.2d 409, 411, 414-16, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 403,
406-08 (1966).
74. 66 Cal. 2d at 272, 425 P.2d at 231, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
75. Id.
76. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
77. 66 Cal. 2d at 265, 425 P.2d at 226, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 626. Presumably, Justice
Tobriner already considered the right of privacy of the bedroom guaranteed by Gris-
wold to include unmarried, as well as married, couples, although the United States
Supreme Court did not so rule until 1972 in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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ysis proceeded on the basis of traditional rights embodied in the fourth
amendment and not expressly on the Griswold decision or the right
of privacy as a separate ground for holding the searches unconstitu-
tional. Nevertheless, he characterized the unconstitutional condition
as the threatened withdrawal of benefits from anyone "who insisted
upon his rights of privacy and repose."718 These references to Griswold
and the right of privacy and repose helped differentiate Parrish from
the criminal context in which fourth amendment claims are most
commonly raised and acknowledged that welfare recipients enjoy the
right to the sancity of their homes to the same extent as others in
society.7
9
In vindicating the right of recipients to be treated with the same
respect for their privacy as other citizens, Justice Tobriner was not
unmindful of the valid concern of the administrative agency to pro-
tect the public fisc against fraudulent applicants. Nevertheless, he
concluded his opinion with this admonition to the County Welfare
Department:
We fully recognize the importance of ferreting out fraud in the
inexcusable garnering of welfare benefits not truly deqprved.
Such efforts, however, must be, and clearly can be, conducted
with due regard for the constitutional rights of welfare recipients.
The county welfare department itself has now abandoned me
technique of investigation which it pursued here; we may thus
rest assured that it will develop other more carefully conceived
procedures. It is surely not beyond the competence of the de-
partment to conduct appropriate investigations without violence
to human dignity and within the confines of the Constitution. 0
78. 66 Cal. 2d at 271, 425 P.2d at 230, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
79. Contra, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), in which a welfare applicant
unsuccessfully challenged required acquiescence in "home visits" by a welfare case-
worker as a violation of fourth amendment rights. There, as in Parrish, the challenge
was premised on the unconstitutional conditioning of AFDC benefits on consent to
such visits. The majority found no fourth amendment violation on the dubious grounds
that "denial of permission is not a criminal act. If consent to the visitation is with-
held, no visitation takes place .... There is no entry of the home and there is no
search." Id. at 317-18. For criticism of the Wyman majority see Justice Douglas'
dissent. Id. at 326. See also P. BRF-sT, PRocrssEs oF CoNsTrruTioNAL DEcISiXON-
MAMNG 806-09 (1975).
80. 66 Cal. 2d at 276, 425 P.2d at 234, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 634. In an article relied
upon by the court in Parrish which was addressed to the unconstitutionality of such
raids, Midnight Welfare Searches, supra note 41, at 1355, Charles Reich pointed out
the inadequacy of retrospective condemnation of these unconstitutional practices, noting
that until 1961 there was for all practical purposes, no remedy whatsoever that could
be invoked by a private individual whose home had been invaded in violation of the
federal constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), changed that situation by
rendering the product of an illegal search inadmissible in evidence in a criminal trial.
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Although the importance of Parrish could be considered more symbolic
than real in view of subsequent regulatory prohibitions against mass
midnight raids, it did demonstrate the judiciary's willingness to take
an active role in recognizing the constitutional rights of the poor.
Further, by sanctioning the refusal of social workers and other state
employees to carry out unlawful instructions, it afforded an additional
potential safeguard to welfare recipients' rights.
People v. Gilbert
Two years after Parrish, Justice Tobriner wrote the opinion of the
court in People v. Gilbert.s' In that case, a welfare mother had been
convicted of the felony of fraudulently obtaining AFDC payments in
violation of the general theft provision of the Penal Code.82  Justice
Tobriner concluded that the special provisions rendering such fraud
a misdemeanor under the Welfare and Institutions Codes precluded
prosecution of welfare fraud under the Penal Code. This determina-
tion was consistent with the general rule of construction that if a special
provision and a general provision overlap, the court is required to give
Reich posited that illegally obtained evidence of a man in the home might also be
inadmissible in a hearing to revoke eligibility for welfare, but questioned the suffi-
ciency of such a remedy for all the innocent people whose homes had been invaded.
Midnight Welfare Searches, supra note 41, at 1358. In view of the unlikelihood that
recipients would seek affirmative relief, Reich suggested the promulgation of federal
regulations prohibiting such mass raids. Id. at 1359. Federal regulations were, of
course, subsequently adopted. See note 66 supra. By upholding the caseworker's
position in Parrish, however, the court adds another possible method for protecting
welfare recipents' rights.
81. 1 Cal. 3d 475, 462 P.2d 580, 82 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1969). All seven justices
concurred in the judgment, but only five concurred in the opinion. Justices Burke
and McComb concurred only in the judgment. Id. at 485, 462 P.2d at 587, 82 Cal.
Rptr. at 731.
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 484 (West 1970). The charge underlying the defen-
dant's conviction was that she failed to notify the welfare authorities of the presence
in her home for approximately four months of an unrelated male. Again, as in Parrish,
the statute under which the department proceeded was former CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 11351 (West 1966), which imposed on a nonadopting stepfather and a "man
assuming the role of spouse" (MARS) an obligation to support the AFDC family with
which he resided. This statutory obligation was implemented by former Department
of Social Welfare Regulation 44-133.5, which conclusively presumed that all of the
income of a MARS, less certain specified deductions and expenses, was available for
the support of the AFDC family. That regulation is set forth in the Gilbert opinion,
1 Cal. 3d at 478-79 n.4, 462 P.2d at 582-83, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27. A directly
conflicting HEW regulation, prohibiting the assumption of the availability of income
from a MARS without proof of actual contributions, was promulgated in the summer
of 1968 (45 C.F.R. § 203.1, transferred to and incorporated as 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a)
(1976)), following the Supreme Court decision in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
83. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11482 (West 1954).
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effect to the special provision alone "as an exception to the general
statute whether it was passed before or after such general enactment."
84
The defendant had also raised constitutional issues regarding the
manner in which the Department of Social Welfare had calculated
the amount of overpayment she had received.8 5 On this issue some
of his colleagues may have parted company with Justice Tobriner.
He had prefaced his opinion with the statement that the court did
not reach the constitutional issues raised by the defendant owing to
its conclusion that proper construction of the statutes required reversal
of her felony conviction.86 He nevertheless addressed fully half of his
opinion to the serious questions of constitutionality raised by the de-
fendant.87  The charge underlying her conviction was that she failed
to notify the welfare authorities of the presence in her home for ap-
proximately four months of an unrelated male. Again, as in Parrish,
the statute under which the department proceeded was former Welfare
and Institutions Code section 11351, which imposed on a "man assum-
ing the role of spouse" (MARS) an obligation to support the AFDC
family with which he resided.
84. In re Williamson, 43 Cal. 2d 651, 654, 276 P.2d 593, 594 (1954), (quoting
People v. Breyer, 139 Cal. App. 547, 550, 34 P.2d 1065, 1066 (1934)).
85. These very constitutional issues were then before the United States Supreme
Court on appeal from the dismissal of a class action by a three-judge court in the
Northern District of California. Lewis v. Stark, 312 F. Supp. 197 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
prob. furis, noted, 396 U.S. 900 (1969). In addition to equal protection, due process,
and right of privacy arguments, plaintiffs contended that the recently promulgated
HEW regulations (see note 82 supra) controlled the issue of California's compliance
with the Social Security Act. The three-judge court came to the opposite conclusion,
finding the HEW regulation invalid and the California scheme consistent with the
Social Security Act. 312 F. Supp. at 201-02. The court distinguished the recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968),
on the grounds that the Alabama statute and regulation there in issue applied whether
or not the MARS lived with the mother, whereas the California statute only dealt with
a man actually "in or around the home." The Alabama scheme punished the AFDC
children by rendering them ineligible for assistance based on their parent's sexual
conduct, whereas the California scheme merely took the MARS' income into account
in computing the grant. 312 F. Supp. at 203-04. On appeal the United States Su-
preme Court struck down the provisions in question but not on constitutional grounds;
rather, the provisions were deemed to conflict with the controlling provisions of the
Social Security Law and recently promulgated administrative regulations of the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
The action was reversed and remanded for a determination of whether the stepfather
provisions of CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11351 (West 1966) stemmed from a general
obligation of support under California law which would justify the attribution of in-
come without proof of actual contribution.
86. 1 Cal. 3d at 481, 462 P.2d at 584, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
87. Id. at 481-84, 462 P.2d at 584-87, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 728-31.
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Justice Tobriner intimated his views and presumably the views of
four other members of the court regarding the constitutional challenges
to this MARS provision.8 He indicated that singling out a male friend
of an AFDC recipient and placing upon him a duty of support that
would not exist but for the fact that he resided with an AFDC family
and that did not carry with it the concomitant benefits available to
a husband under the AFDC program89 might well constitute a denial
of equal protection. He noted similarities between the MARS pro-
vision then before the court and the relative responsibility provision
previously invalidated in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner.90
Justice Tobriner further opined that the regulation's conclusive pre-
sumption that the MARS contributed income to the needy children
with whom he resided "raises problems of procedural due process, and
may not be rationally related to the basic purposes of the AFDC pro-
gram."91 He discussed in a lengthy footnote the "due process" ques-
tions raised by such an irrebuttable presumption. 92  He also treated
88. In the fall of 1969, the California MARS scheme was repealed and a revised
scheme was enacted. Language in CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11351 (West 1966),
referring to "adult male persons assuming the role of spouse," was removed and a new
provision (to be implemented by appropriate new regulations) was adopted, requiring
a MARS to make a financial contribution to the AFDC family with which he resides,
which contribution "shall not be less than it would cost him to provide himself with
an independent living arrangement." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11351.5 (West
1972). This new scheme was upheld against constitutional attack in Russell v. Carle-
son, 36 Cal. App. 3d 334, 111 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1973). The remainder of § 11351
(referring only to the effect on AFDC grants of income of stepfathers) was repealed
in 1971 in connection with the Welfare Reform Act. At the same time, the legislature
enacted CAL. Civ. CODE § 5127.5 (West 1977) making a nonadoptive stepfather's
income liable for the support of his wife's children to the extent of his wife's com-
munity property interest therein, less certain exemptions.
89. 1 Cal. 3d at 482-83, 462 P.2d at 585-86, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30.
90. Id., citing Dep't of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d
720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964).
91. 1 Cal. 3d at 483-84, 462 P.2d at 586, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
92. Id. at 484 n.13, 462 P.2d at 586-87, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 730-31. This opinion
was written during the period when the concept of irrebuttable presumptions was in
its heyday. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlan-
dis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The ir-
rebuttable presumption actually presented a rephrased equal protection question and
not a question of due process. By making a presumption irrebuttable, what the reg-
ulating body actually does is remove the issue from the adjudicative process; persons
to whom the irrebuttable presumption applies are classified and treated according to
the dictates of that presumption with no opportunity to challenge the underlying facts.
Judicial decisions striking down irrebuttable presumptions could be recharacterized
as super-legislative determinations that with respect to the particular subject of legis-
lation rigid classification is improper. The Supreme Court abruptly abandoned the
irrebuttable presumption concept in Weinberger v. Salf, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). See
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in a footnote9 s the equal protection question of whether the classifica-
tion created by the MARS regulation was rationally related to the
basic purposes of the AFDC program 94 and, in a final footnote, ob-
served that new federal regulations requiring the state to abandon the
questioned procedures apparently mooted the constitutional question.9
Justice Tobriner's opinion in Gilbert again demonstrated his will-
ingness "creatively [to enter] the arena of political family law."96 In
effect, through dicta, he informed the legislature and the Department
of Social Welfare of the court's continuing concern for the application
of constitutional principles to welfare programs and intimated that
corrective procedures not only would be welcomed but were probably
constitutionally mandated.
Guerrero v. Carleson
Guerrero v. Carleson97 involved a due process challenge to ter-
mination notices printed in English that were sent to recipients the
Department of Social Welfare knew to be fluent only in Spanish.98
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had recently
rejected a similar argument in Carmona v. Sheffield,99 a case in which
the plaintiffs sought Spanish translation services in connection with
the California unemployment program. In an opinion joined by five
the discussion in the majority opinion, 422 U.S. at 767-85, and the dissenting opin-
ion of Justice Brennan, id. at 802-05.
93. 1 Cal. 3d at 484, n.14, 462 P.2d at 587, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
94. A federal district court had declared a similar Alabama rule unconstitutional
on the basis that the punishment of an AFDC child by withholding benefits to control
his mother's immorality was not rationally related to the purposes of the AFDC pro-
gram to provide assistance for needy children and families. Smith v. King, 277 F.
Supp. 31 (N.D. Ala. 1967). On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the district court decision on statutory grounds, declining to reach the constitutional
issue. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). The constitutional issue was reached, however, by Jus-
tice Douglas in his concurring opinion. Id. at 334. Justice Peters, dissenting in
People v. Shirley, 55 Cal. 2d 521, 526, 360 P.2d 33, 36, 11 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540 (1961),
similarly characterized the California MARS regulations as "obviously unsound." He
did not expressly address the constitutional issue, however, because he would have
held that the withholding of benefits by means of administrative regulation constituted
a void usurpation of legislative power. Id. at 527, 360 P.2d at 36, 11 Cal. Rptr.
at 540.
95. 1 Cal. 3d at 485 n.15, 462 P.2d at 587, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
96. California's Dual System of Family Law, supra note 12, at 646.
97. 9 Cal. 3d 808, 512 P.2d 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973).
98. The plaintiffs' ability to understand only Spanish was clearly marked on their
files.
99. 475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973).
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other justices, Justice Mosk acknowledged the desirability of providing
a welfare termination notice in Spanish but concluded that "it does
not rise to the level of a constitutional imperative." ' 0
Justice Tobriner dissented. Relying on Mullane v, Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co.'"" and Goldberg v. Kelly,'0 2 he asserted that
as a matter of procedural due process the recipients were entitled to
notice reasonably calculated to advise them of the action taken regard-
ing their unemployment benefits and to an opportunity to present
their objections. Noting that a recipient must request a hearing with-
in fifteen days of termination and further commenting on the life-and-
death aspects of welfare relief,oa Justice Tobriner stated that, on the
question of adequacy of the termination notices, the balance must be
struck in favor of the recipients. On the one hand, the Department
had already been printing some forms in Spanish, so it would appear
that the burden of also printing termination notices in Spanish would
be slight.'0 4  On the other hand, if the recipients could not get the
notices interpreted in time to assert their right to a hearing, they would
be subjected to a "crucial" loss.o° \ With readily available translation
capability, timely and adequate notice as required in Goldberg and
Mullane was clearly not met by notification in English to persons
known to understand only Spanish.
The majority expressed concern that a favorable ruling would re-
quire the state to conduct all its affairs in every language that is spoken
by persons under its jurisdiction. justice Tobriner responded that this
"parade of horribles" could be easily avoided by balancing the expense
and inconvenience to the state of printing notice in foreign languages
against the burden otherwise resulting to the non-English speaking
individuals with whom the state was communicating, taking into ac-
count the number of persons fluent only in a particular non-English
language and the deprivation that would result if translation services
were not provided."1; In conclusion, Justice Tobriner regretted that
100. 9 Cal. 3d 809, 512 P.2d 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973). But see Castro v.
State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970), declaring the California
constitutional provision conditioning voting rights upon ability to read and write Eng-
lish violative of the fourteenth amendment.
101. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
102. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
103. 9 Cal. 3d at 820-21, 512 P.2d at 841-42, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 209-10.
104. Id. at 820, 512 P.2d at 841, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
105. Id. at 821, 512 P.2d at 841, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
106. Id. at 821-22, 512 P.2d at 841-43, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 209-11.
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"[iln the long effort of the subgroups in our culture to attain recogni-
tion and participation the majority opinion can only be an unfortunate
step backwards."'10
Nonetheless, the majority's wish to avoid a constitutional ruling
that would require a case-by-case analysis of whether a notice printed
in English was sufficient to apprise the recipient of the action taken
is understandable. The majority clearly sympathized with the plight
of wrongfully terminated, non-English-speaking recipients who did
not realize their right to a hearing in time to assert it, but had difficulty
elevating the demand for translation to a due process guarantee.'-1
Later that year the legislature took the hint and passed the Dy-
mally-Alatorre Bilingual Services Act, 10 9 which specifically declared:
[T]he effective maintenance and development of a free and demo-
cratic society depends on the right'and ability of its citizens and
residents to communicate with their government and the right
and ability of the government to communicate with them.
It is the intention of the legislature in enacting this chapter
to provide for effective communication between all levels of
government in this state and the people of this state who are
precluded from utilizing public services because of language
barriers."10
The Act requires all state and local public agencies serving a substan-
tial number of non-English-speaking people to "employ a sufficient
number of qualified bilingual persons" to ensure provision of infor-
mation and services "in the language of the non-English-speaking
person.""' It further requires any materials explaining available
services to "be translated into any non-English language spoken by
a substantial number of the public served by the agency."" 2  What
107. Id. at 823, 512 P.2d at 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 211. See Comment, "Citado
a Comparecer": Language Barriers and Due Process - Is Mailed Notice in English
Constitutionally Sufficient? 61 CAutF. L. RBv. 1395 (1973). After a thoughtful
analysis of all aspects of the constitutional issue raised by the language barrier, the
author comes to the same conclusion as does Justice Tobriner, that the "zealously
guarded" due process guarantee of the right to receive effective notice includes for-
eign language notice "[w]hen the serving party is aware that English-language notice
will not be understood, and when translation services are readily available at low
cost." Id. at 1421.
108. 9 Cal. 3d 817, 512 P.2d 839, 109 Cal. Rptr. 207.
109. 1973 Cal. Stats., ch. 1182 § 1 (codified at CAL. Cov'T CODE §§ 7290-99
(West Supp. 1977)).
110. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7291 (West Supp. 1977).
111. Id. §§ 7292, 7293.
112. Id. §7295.
September 1977] RIGHTS OF WELFARE RECIPIENTS
constitutes a substantial number and how many translators are suf-
ficient are determinations delegated to the particular agencies.1""
The very breadth of the Dymally-Alatorre Bilingual Services Act
demonstrates the desirability of imposing translation requirements
through the legislature and not through the courts, especially because
effectuation of the policy of ensuring notice to non-English-speaking
persons requires the cooperation of the agencies involved. Neverthe-
less, the passage of that Act was a moral victory for Justice Tobriner,
one that a dissenter rarely achieves so quickly.
Fiscal Politics and Principled Judicial Decisionmaking
In 1969 constitutional and statutory challenges to state welfare
programs were just beginning to reach the United States Supreme
Court. Soon after Alabama's MARS income attribution provisions
were declared incompatible with the controlling HEW regulation in
King v. Smith,'1 4 the high court in Lewis v. Martin' 15 also invalidated
California's MARS income provisions. Between King and Lewis the
United States Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Shapiro
v. Thompson," ' a six-to-three decision striking down, as violative of
the right to travel, statutory provisions of three jurisdictions 1 7 that
imposed one-year residency requirements on applicants for welfare
assistance. The Court rejected the argument that public assistance
benefits are a "'privilege' and not a 'right' "1"' and also rejected as a
"compelling interest" preservation of the fiscal integrity of state public
assistance programs. 1" 9 Logically extended, Shapiro could have revo-
lutionized the American welfare system. As Justice Harlan observed
in dissent, Justice Brennan's opinion included the "cryptic suggestion
that the 'compelling interest' test is applicable merely because the
result of the classification may be to deny the appellees 'food, shelter
and other necessities of life'. . "..120
113. Id. §§ 7292, 7293, 7295.
114. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
115. 397 U.S. 552 (1970). Both Lewis and King rested on the ground that the
federal regulations permitted deductions from AFDC grants only for income actually
received, whereas the states were impermissibly reducing AFDC grants based merely
on presumed income.
116. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
117. Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C.
118. 394 U.S. at 627 n.6.
119. Id. at 627-28, 633.
120. Id. at 661 (citation omitted), referring to majority opinion at 627. This
suggestion was made explicit in Justice Marshall's dissent, joined by Justice Brennan,
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Justice Brennan again wrote for the majority in Goldberg v.
Kelly,' 2' which mandated notice and a hearing prior to termination
of public assistance. In reaching that decision the Court acknowl-
edged Professor Charles Reich's formulation of the concept of welfare
entitlement as a property right of the poor.
122
These decisions seemed to establish a constitutional standard of
strict judicial scrutiny of legislation that affects welfare recipients.
In 1970, with the advent of the Burger Court, there was a marked
retreat from the principles of constitutional analysis suggested in
Shapiro and Goldberg. The new position of the Court was manifested
in Dandridge v. Williams, 23 in which state welfare programs were
equated with traditional state economic regulation;12 the Court thus
reverted to an equal protection standard of minimum rationality to
uphold Maryland's maximum AFDC grant against a constitutional
challenge.
Not long after Warren Burger succeeded Chief Justice Warren
on the United States Supreme Court, Governor Reagan appointed
Donald Wright to replace retiring Chief Justice Traynor on the Cali-
fornia high court.125  The governor apparently hoped to duplicate on
the state level the conservative shift achieved by the Nixon appoint-
ments to the United States Supreme Court. The new Chief Justice
was soon to disappoint the governor.' 26  One of the first welfare
decisions in which Chief Justice Wright would participate was the
unanimous decision in County of San Mateo v. Boss, 27 which applied
the principle articulated in Kirchner in holding unconstitutional wel-
fare provisions requiring adult children of recipients of aid to the aged
to reimburse the state.
This controversial decision provoked immediate action by the
legislature, which came up for review by the California Supreme Court
in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 522 (1970): "[wlhen a benefit . . . is ne-
cessary to sustain life, stricter constitutional standards . . . are applied .... "
121. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970), de-
cided together with Goldberg v. Kelly, dealing with California's failure to provide
pretermination hearings.
122. 397 U.S. at 262 n.8.
123. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
124. Id. at 484.
125. Chief Justice Wright was appointed on April 6, 1970. Governor Reagan
announced the appointment by saying, "It is my fervent hope that under Justice
Wright's able leadership, the court will return to a policy of judicial restraint." 88
THE RcoRauE 66, April 7, 1970, at 1, col. 6.
126. See 102 THE REcoREaR 22, Feb. 1, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
127. 3 Cal. 3d 962, 479 P.2d 654, 92 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1971).
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in Swoap v. Superior Court.128  All of the justices but Tobriner and
Mosk were convinced that the new legislative provisions had effectively
overruled Boss. Until this 1973 disagreement over the issues in Swoap,
the court had been invalidating discriminatory governmental acts
against the poor with unanimity.
29
Mooney v. Pickett
Although the discussion of constitutional rights in the early To-
briner opinion in Parrish and the dicta of Gilbert were reassuring to
welfare recipients and their advocates, neither opinion had had much
direct impact on the administration of welfare in California because
the procedures subjected to constitutional challenge had already been
forbidden by federal regulations by the time the decisions were
handed down. 130 In contrast, Justice Tobriner's opinion in Mooney v.
Pickettl3' had considerable impact because it affected the current prac-
tice in at least thirteen counties. These counties had reduced their
welfare rolls by excluding "employable" single men from nonemer-
gency general assistance payments.' 
2
Mooney, a unanimous decision, was a class action challenging a
San Mateo county regulation that stated that "[g]enerally speaking,
128. 10 Cal. 3d 490, 516 P.2d 840, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1973).
129. Until 1973, the California Court's difficulty had been created in cases where
the new Nixon majority on the United States Supreme Court interpreted provisions
of the Social Security Act in a manner contrary to previous rulings which had been
relied upon by the California court in reaching its decisions. See, e.g., Villa v. Hall,
6 Cal. 3d 227, 490 P.2d 1148, 98 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1971) vacated and remanded in
light of Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), 406 U.S. 965 (1972).
130. For regulations mooting the constitutional issue posed by the mass raids in
Parrish, see note 68 supra. See People v. Gilbert, 1 Cal. 3d 475, 485 n.15, 462 P.2d
580, 587, 82 Cal. Rptr. 724, 731, for a discussion of federal regulations subsequently
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) as mooting
the constitutional question raised therein.
131. 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).
132. Another case which had some concrete effect was California Welfare Rights
Organization v. Carleson, 4 Cal. 3d 445, 482 P.2d 670, 93 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1971),
decided just prior to Mooney, which required the state to implement federally man-
dated cost of living increases. The impact of that case (a unanimous opinion by
Justice Burke invalidating emergency regulations that, inter alia, effectuated without
legislative authorization a percentage reduction of AFDC grants to offset the cost of
living increases mandated by federal law) was, however, only to help precipitate the
inevitable. Justice Burke noted that, while the United States Supreme Court in Ro-
sado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) contemplated that state legislatures could nullify
the mandated cost of living increases by percentage reduction of grants, 4 Cal. 3d at
451, 482 P.2d at 674, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 762, this holding in no way legitimated an ad-
ministrative attempt to accomplish that result without statutory authorization. Id. at
458-59, 482 P.2d at 680, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
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employable persons are not eligible for General Assistance. . . . As-
sistance will be granted to employable adults only in emergencies." 133
Justice Tobriner's opinion held that this regulation violated the man-
date of Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000, requiring every
county to relieve and support all incompetent, poor, and indigent
persons. Citing Goldberg v. Kelley, Justice Tobriner wrote that the
issue presented by the case was one of great public concern and im-
portance because the challenged rule could deny many residents of
the various counties having such regulations "the means to obtain
essential food, clothing, housing and medical care."134  He analyzed
the relevant provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code and found
references to recipients who might be neither unemployable nor in-
competent. 135 He then examined the legislative history of the statu-
tory provisions in question. Concluding that employable indigents
had been included historically by the legislature, he determined that
the obligation imposed on the counti6s by the currently applicable
legislation was a mandatory duty, rather than a discretionary directive,
to furnish aid to all eligible indigents.136 The statutory provision, 3 7
which provides that each county may establish standards of eligibility
for general assistance, did not give a county authority arbitrarily to
exclude a class of otherwise qualified applicants or to impose standards
of eligibility in conflict with the objectives of the enabling legislation.
In delineating the discretion which counties were permitted to exercise,
Justice Tobriner relied on Government Code section 11374. That
section provides that when a statute confers upon a state agency the
authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific
or otherwise carry out statutory provisions, the agency's regulations
must be "consistent and not in conflict with the statute," and reasonably
necessary to effectuate its purpose.
The county had argued in defense 'of its employable man rule
that "employability" was an economic resource which other indigents
did not have. Justice Tobriner readily dismissed this sophistic argu-
ment because the term "employability" as used by the county merely
denoted that a man was physically and mentally fit for work; it did
not signify that a job awaited him. 38
133. DEPr OF SOcIAL S-vWCFcs, SAx MATEO COUNTY, CAL., Manual of Policies
and Procedures, Reg. GA-08 (1969).
134. 4 Cal. 3d at 675, 483 P.2d at 1234, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
135. Id. at 676, 483 P.2d at 1235-36, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 283-84.
136. Id. at 678, 483 P.2d at 1237, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
137. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17001 (West 1972).
138. 4 Cal. 3d at 679-80 n.12, 483 P.2d at 1238, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
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To the man who cannot obtain employment his theoretical em-
ployability is a barren resource; it is inedible; it provides neither
shelter nor any other necessity of life. Until he can get a job,
he does not differ in economic resources from the man whose un-
employment stems from more personal disabilities.'
A more telling argument advanced by the county was that it could
simply not afford to extend general assistance to employable persons;
the county estimated that the abolition of the employable single man
rule would double the cost of general assistance. 140  The very real
problems of the limited financial capabilities of local, state, and federal
governments were a practical consideration to which the courts were
not blind.14' Nevertheless, if the cost of welfare were accepted as a
justification for every action taken by an administrative agency, then
public assistance benefits would be truly a discretionary charity with
few, if any, constitutional protections for recipients. 142  Justice To-
briner's response to the county's argument was the only position that
could be taken, consistent with principled judicial decisionmaking:
We are aware of the financial difficulties which attend present
welfare programs on local, state, and national levels. This court,
however, is not fitted to write a new welfare law for the State of
California, and while the Legislature addresses itself to that task
it remains our task to enforce the existing law. We observe that
the county retains extensive authority to establish standards for
General Assistance, both as to eligibility and as to amount of aid.
In view of this discretion, the county can surely find many ways
which do not violate state statute [sic] which it can limit Gen-
eral Assistance payments to the financial resources available.
143
Mooney recognized that so-called employable persons are just as
deserving of the basic necessities of life as unemployable indigents.
Further, it cautioned counties and administrative agencies to observe
their duty faithfully to implement the laws passed by the state legis-
lature. The court asserted its willingness to act as a watchdog to
ensure that this duty was being met.
144
139. Id. at 680, 483 P.2d at 1238, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969); Morris v. Williams,
67 Cal. 2d 733, 433 P.2d 697, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1967).
142. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). But see Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
143. 4 Cal. 3d at 680, 483 P.2d at 1238, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
144. In Roberts v. Brian, 6 Cal. 3d 1, 489 P.2d 1378, 98 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1971),
Justice Tobriner again wrote a unanimous opinion for the court, demonstrating the
contrast between the flexible approach of the court and the rigid approach of the
administering state agency in regard to meeting the needs of the individual recipients
of public assistance in a unique but tragic situation. The petitioner suffered from
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The attempt of the counties to limit their welfare rolls by dis-
tinguishing between deserving and undeserving poor based on their
potential to obtain unavailable employment paralleled the distinctions
then being drawn by Governor Reagan's administration during the
negotiation of the Welfare Reform Act of 1971.145  As will be seen,
similar issues to those raised and resolved in Mooney would arise again
in regard to the state Department of Welfare's questionable interpre-
tation of major provisions of the Welfare Reform Act. In fact, the
supreme court upheld recently a contempt order issued against the
Plumas County Board of Supervisors after they had refused to follow
the mandate of state and federal laws regarding the payment of wel-
fare benefits.1 40  The Board had alleged that the laws' provisions,
if followed, would impose an undue strain on the county's budget.
This controversy is ongoing. Resolution by the courts is difficult in
light of the economic reality of insufficient funds to provide subsist-
ence level income to all of the state's indigent and the political tend-
chronic myoclonic epilepsy and had been receiving aid to the totally disabled (ATD).
He required fifteen hours of personal nursing care per day, but the Director of Health
Care Services had refused to pay for such exceptional care on the grounds that it did
not come within any of the classifications of medical treatments specified in existing
Medi-Cal regulations. The Director did not argue that such individualized treatment
was infeasible but merely that it was not specifically authorized. Although the court
agreed that the unique disease did not fit precisely within "any of the pigeon holes
of the Medi-Cal regulations," it nontheless refused to consign the petitioner to death.
Id. at 10, 489 P.2d at 1385, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 57. Instead it found general authority
in the governing statutes and regulations to permit the payment of these exceptional
services and therefore mandated the Director of Health Care Services to make such
payments. It further indicated that because new regulations were being considered,
the Director should make some attempt to deal with this problem in the new regulations.
145. The avowed goal of the Reagan administration was to protect the "truly
needy," those recipients without any outside resources, and to refuse to subsidize the
"legal cheaters" "whose greed is greater than their need," i.e., those AFDC families
with some outside income or resources. Welfare Out of Control, U.S. NEws & WoRLD
REPORT, Feb. 8, 1971, at 30. See CAL. DEP'T OF SocLt.L WELFUR, WELFARE RE-
FORM IN CALIFORNIA 8, 10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WELFARE REFORm IN CAUI-
FORNIA].
146. Ross v. Superior Ct., 19 Cal. 3d 889, 569 P.2d 727, 141 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1977)
(Tobriner, J., writing for a majority of four). Plumas County supervisors were found
in contempt of court for failing to make retroactively-mandated payments to pregnant
recipients and AFDC children sharing housing with recipients of aid to the aged,
blind, or disabled in a consolidated action brought by the successful litigants in Cal-
ifornia Welfare Rights Organization v. Brain, 11 Cal. 3d 237, 520 P.2d 970, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 154 (1974) and Cooper v. Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 856, 524 P.2d 97, 115 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1974). Continued refusal of the county to make back welfare payments recently
prompted a Sacramento superior court judge to give the state authority to start re-
ceivership proceedings against the county. See 102 THER Econuna 19, Jan. 27, 1977,
at 1, col. 6-7.
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ency to allocate the insufficient funds among prospective recipients
according to their "worthiness."
California's Welfare Reform Act of 1971
In the Mooney opinion Justice Tobriner adverted to the mammoth
legislative undertaking then in progress to overhaul California's wel-
fare laws47 an undertaking precipitated by an unprecedented growth
in the state's welfare rolls I'4 which had been characterized by Gover-
nor Reagan as "a cancer eating at our vitals."!4' Welfare reform was
the recognized central plank of Governor Reagan's bid for the presi-
dential nomination 50 and the "Number One Priority" of his second
term.15 ' His concept of reform, however, was almost diametrically
opposed to that of the predominantly Democratic legislature.' 52  Leg-
islative leaders attributed the welfare crisis primarily to the national
recession and therefore favored a federal solution in the form of a
national income maintenance program, such as President Nixon was
then proposing.' 5 3  They contemplated that the concomitant stream-
lining of the state's program would produce a savings that could be
used to finance AFDC grant increases and supportive social services
designed to reduce welfare dependence.154 Governor Reagan, on the
other hand, blamed intervention from Washington for the "runaway
welfare crisis" and vehemently opposed a federalized system of guar-
anteed income. 5- His strategy of reform involved increased state
control. It included "purification" of the present system by curbing
welfare fraud and by reducing aid to "legal cheaters" I '6 and increasing
aid to the "truly needy," AFDC families with no outside income."-,
147. 4 Cal. 3d at 680, 483 P.2d at 1238, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
148. See WELFARE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, note 145 supra, at 8.
149. Welfare Out of Control, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 8, 1971, at 30
(quoting Governor Reagan in his 1971 message to the state legislature).
150. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME: THE NIxoN ADMIN-
ISTRATION AND THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN 374-75 (1973).
151. See WELFARE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 145, at 8.
152. See Beilenson & Agran, The Welfare Reform Act of 1971, 3 PAC. L.J. 475
(1972) [hereinafter cited as The Welfare Reform Act of 1971].
153. Id. at 478.
154. Id. at 479.
155. Testimony of Governor Reagan before the Senate Finance Committee (Feb.
1, 1972) (reprinted in WELFARE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 145, at 151).
156. AFDC families with significant outside income were considered "legal cheat-
ers." This group constituted approximately one-third of all AFDC families in Cali-
fornia at the time. The Welfare Reform Act of 1971, supra note 152, at 481 n.27.
157. See Address by Governor Reagan, Town Hall (Mar. 3, 1971) (cited in The
Welfare Reform Act of 1971, supra note 152, at 477 n.8).
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Extensive and often bitter negotiations' 38 produced the Welfare
Reform Act of 1971. The Act was hailed by the Reagan administra-
tion as a major political victory for the Governor and as "the cutting
edge of welfare reform in this country." 1 9 On the other hand, it was
characterized by Senator Beilenson, the Chairman of the California
Senate Health and Welfare Committee, as "'schizophrenic legislation'
- providing important new benefits to the poor in some areas while
at the same time imposing new, and often harsh, restrictions in
other areas." 60  He perceived it not as "total welfare reform" but
as merely an interim step until the establishment of a national income
maintenance program. 61
The principal achievement of the new act was the substitution
of a uniform flat grant system for the prior legislative scheme, which
had delegated to the Department of Social Welfare the authority to
determine recipients' needs on an individualized basis, up to a statutory
maximum.162 At the same time the statute withdrew the department's
authority independently to establish an objective minimum standard
of need against which to measure the grant payment 163 and substituted
a statutory standard of need.6 4
The flat grant system was designed to effect a substantial admin-
istrative savings by eliminating the necessity of individualized need
determinations. 65 It was also designed "as a leveling mechanism to
increase benefits to recipients with no outside income and to decrease
benefits to recipients with significant outside income." 66 Under the
158. The Welfare Reform Act of 1971, supra note 152, at 479; WELFARE REFoRm
iN CALnrpow-A, supra note 145, at 16.
159. See WELFA1RE REonmr iN CALwoRNA, supra note 145, at 16. Under the
prior law, the department determined grant payments to a particular eligible family
by reference to detailed allowance schedules for particular need items such as food
and clothing based on factors such as family size, age of children, county of residence,
and the like, and by payment of other need items such as housing and utilities in ac-
cordance with actual expenses up to a specified administrative maximum. Cooper v.
Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 856, 861-63, 524 P.2d 97, 99,101, 115 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3-5 (1974).
The total grant could not exceed the statutory maximum.
160. The Welfare Reform Act of 1971, supra note 152, at 475-76.
161. Id. at 502.
162. Former CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450(a) (West 1954) (repealed and
superseded effective 1971).
163. Former CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 11452 (West 1966).
164. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11452 (West 1972).
165. See Cooper v. Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 856, 861-62, 524 P.2d 97, 100, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 4 (1974); WELFARE REroRm iN CArLwoN, supra note 145, at 14. The
United States Supreme Court had recently approved such a simplified system based
on "a fair averaging" of welfare grants. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
166. The Welfare Reform Act of 1971, supra note 152, at 480.
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previous system, because the maximum per-family grant always fell
short of the standard of need, families with some outside income were
permitted to retain that income to bridge the gap between their ob-
jective need and their grant payment without suffering any reduction
in benefits. 16 7  The leveling mechanism instituted by the Welfare Re-
form Act eliminated this differential between AFDC families without
any source of outside income and families with some outside income.
This effect was accomplished by the subtraction of non-exempt income
directly from the statutory flat grant rather than from the higher
statutory standard of need.""'
The reaction of welfare rights groups to the flat grant approach
was ambivalent. Although they were understandably concerned about
the reduction of benefits to families hitherto receiving higher grants
than the new average, they could not object to the increase in benefits
which resulted to other families. Nor could they object to the pro-
jected savings in administrative costs that the legislature intended to
funnel back into the benefit program. Moreover, the flat grant ap-
proach embodied "the money payment principle,"0 9 by which recip-
ients received their grant money and autonomously determined how
it was to be allocated to their needs. By contrast, under the prior
paternalistic system the department had determined the budgetary
needs of individual recipients on an item-by-item basis.
1 70
While the Welfare Reform Act was still in the process of nego-
tiation, organizations such as San Francisco Neighborhood Legal As-
sistance Foundation (SFNLAF) voiced their vehement opposition to
numerous supplementary provisions of the proposed flat grant system,
such as the dollar-for-dollar reduction of grants for the receipt of
income. This provision appeared to contravene a controlling pro-
vision of the federal legislation.1 7' There were, in addition, other
more blatantly illegal provisions, such as a one-year residency require-
ment17 2 for welfare eligibility in counties with high unemployment
167. See id. at 481.
168. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450(a) (West 1954). See The Welfare Re-
form Act of 1971, supra note 152, at 480.
169. Cooper v. Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 856, 862 n.6, 524 P.2d 97, 100, 115 Cal. Rptr.
1, 4 (1974).
170. Id.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1970).
172. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11252.5 (West 1954). This provision applied
only to needy parents of children in the AFDC program. No comparable provision
was enacted with respect to the old age assistance, and to the totally disabled, or aid
to the blind programs. The provision was immediately challenged in a class action
and summary judgment was granted in favor of plaintiffs on February 15, 1972. Brown
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rates. The latter provision directly conflicted with the mandate of
Shapiro v. Thompson.
173
In fact, Governor Reagan and the legislative leadership were fully
cognizant of the vulnerability of such provisions to constitutional at-
tack.174  The Governor's strategy soon became evident: to pressure
the courts to assume a deferential approach, thereby approving all
of the new legislation and administrative regulations.'- 5  When this
strategy proved unsuccessful, he blamed the courts for "bungling
interference" with welfare reform.17
6
Prior to the Reform Act, administrative conduct in contravention
of federal mandates 77 had already led welfare rights organizations
to declare outright war17 8 against the Reagan administration. After
observing the form the new compromise legislation was taking, leaders
of these organizations warned that, as soon as it was enacted, they
would take their challenges to the courts.
v. Carleson, No. 217636 (Sacramento County, Cal. Super. Ct., Feb. 15, 1972) (no
appeal taken).
173. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In fact, Shapiro involved fewer equal protection is-
sues than did Brown v. Carleson, No. 217636 (Sacramento County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
Feb. 15, 1972) (no appeal taken), because the one-year residency requirement in
Brown only applied to AFDC parents and also only applied in counties with six per-
cent or more unemployment.
174. In a newspaper article published contemporaneously with the enactment of
the Welfare Reform Act, State Senator Anthony Beilenson wrote: "Our strategy was to
give the Governor a watered-down unconstitutional residency requirement in exchange
for real program benefits. ... Passing the buck to the courts is, of course, not the
preferred way to legislate. But in terms of the ultimate effects on poor people, the
trade-off in this instance seems reasonable." ACLU, S. Cal. Open Forum, Oct. 1971,
at 3, col. 4.
175. See generally L.A. Times, Oct. 2, 1971, § 1, at 1, col. 5: "Using some of
the harshest language he has ever used publicly against the judiciary, Reagan charged
[that] the courts made 'hasty and uninformed decisions' . . . . The Governor's state-
ment . . . was followed shortly by a news conference with James M. Hall, Secretary
of Human Relations . . . . [who] delivered an even stronger attack on the Supreme
Court, declaring it had been 'used' by the antipoverty lawyers . . .
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 488 P.2d 953, 97
Cal. Rptr. 385 (1971); California Welfare Eights Organization v. Carleson, 4 Cal.
3d 445, 482 P.2d 670, 93 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1971). See WELrrm LAW, supra note 10,
at 579. The commentator suggests that the cases therein discussed not only reflect
"a pattern of law violation on the part of the welfare bureaucracy of this state, but
[also] . . . a pattern of intentional avoidance of court judgments." Id. at 580.
178. See reprint of handout to welfare recipients prepared by welfare rights or-
ganizations, WELFAE REFoR IN CAu ioRa.u, supra note 145, at 20:
"Our Goal 100,000 Fair Hearing Requests and Grant Hearing Requests
$100 million in Back Money for California Rights Organization
Membership
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Reinterpretation of Controlling Federal Legislation
The first case under the new act, Villa v. Hall,'19 reached the
California Supreme Court by writ of mandate less than three weeks
after the law was enacted 'so and just one day after the court issued
its landmark decision in the public school financing challenge of
Serrano v. Priest, ' holding that wealth was a suspect classification
that required "close scrutiny" was required regardless of whether dis-
crimination based on it was de facto or de jure.18 2  In Villa, the peti-
tioning class of recipients challenged, as violative of the governing
provisions of the Social Security Act, the previously mentioned re-
quirement of the Welfare Reform Act for a dollar-for-dollar reduction
of a recipient's grant on the basis of nonexempt income. Relying
on the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the controlling
federal provisions in Rosado v. Wyman, ' "8 Justice Mosk, writing for
100,000 new members for our local groups
Screw up the County and State Welfare Departments
STOP REAGAN FROM BECOMING PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES
And anything else you might want to do - THIS IS WAR"
179. 6 Cal. 3d 227, 490 P.2d 1148, 98 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1971) vacated and remanded
in light of Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), 406 U.S. 965. On remand,
the California Supreme Court discharged the alternative writ, denied the preemptory
writ, and vacated the order staying operation of § 28 of the Welfare Reform Act. 7
Cal. 3d 926, 500 P.2d 887, 103 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1972).
180. The Act was signed by the Governor on August 13, 1971, to become effec-
tive October 1, 1971. The writ of mandate was filed with the court on August 31,
1971. In granting the writ, the court also granted a stay order preventing implemen-
tation of the challenged provisions, pending determination of their validity by the court.
181. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
182. Id. at 601-04, 487 P.2d at 1252-55, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612-15.
183. 397 U.S. 397 (1970). In Rosado, Justice Harlan, writing for the majority,
required New York State to comply with a congressional amendment to the Social Se-
curity Act that required all participating states to make cost of living adjustments in
their welfare benefit programs. A question was raised as to whether the courts were
the proper body to determine compliance. The Rosado court expressly rejected the
argument which had previously been implicitly rejected in King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309 (1968), that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare had exclusive
primary jurisdiction to determine a state program's compliance with federal law be-
cause Congress had empowered HEW to cut off federal funds from a noncomplying
state. Chief Justice Burger shared Justice Black's view that HEW had been given
primary jurisdiction to determine a state's compliance with the federal welfare scheme.
Id. at 430 (Black, J., dissenting).
Reliance upon HEW denial of funds as the sole permissible sanction would have
effectively prohibited welfare recipients from obtaining any relief from a recalcitrant
state. This point was to be graphically demonstrated by the difficulty involved in
implementing the same federal cost of living provision in California. See California
Welfare Rights Organization v. Carleson, 4 Cal. 3d 445, 448-50, 482 P.2d 670, 672-74,
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a unanimous court, held that the challenged portion of the new legis-
lation violated both the letter and the spirit of the Social Security Act,
which required income to be taken into consideration in determining
need of a recipient.8 4  As required by federal law, income could be
subtracted only from the statutory need figure and not from the lesser
maximum-grant figure. This latter figure related solely to California's
budgetary constraints, which disabled it from providing 100 percent
of recipients' needs.
As the Villa court was well aware, the validity of a similar Texas
provision was simultaneously being considered by the new conserva-
tive majority on the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Jefferson v. Hackney.8 5 Instead of a statutory maximum grant, like
that in California, Texas was one of twenty-six states using the al-
ternative budgetary device of a percentage reduction system. 8 6 Jus-
93 Cal. Rptr. 758, 760-62 (1971). The application of the cost of living increases
to California's maximum grants was clear from the outset. The interplay was to take
effect July, 1969. Nevertheless, the State of California delayed implementing these
increases until June, 1971. Meanwhile, both federal and state courts had declared
that the state was not in compliance with federal law. Bryant v. Montgomery, No.
51909-AJZ (N.D. Cal. filed August 6, 1969) -e'd on other grounds sub nor. Bryant
v. Carleson, 444 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1971); California Welfare Rights Organization
v. Carleson, 4 Cal. 3d 445, 482 P.2d 670, 93 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1971). HEW, prodded
by private suits to compel it to take action, had reached a similar conclusion and had
twice notified the state of its decision to terminate federal funds if compliance was not
forthcoming. The first such notification by HEW had been issued and withdrawn
within twenty-four hours after a quick series of telephone calls between Governor
Reagan, Vice President Agnew, and HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson, in which Rich-
ardson was persuaded to rescind the HEW decision, pending final resolution of Cali-
fornia Welfare Rights Organization v. Carleson, 4 Cal. 3d 445, 482 P.2d 670, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 758 (1971). See P. SrrKrN, WELFARE LAw: NARowm THE GAP BETWEEN
CONGRESSIONAL POLICY Aim LocAL PRACTICE:, SruoTEs IN PUBLIC WELFARE, SUBcoi-
irE ON FiscAL POLICY or mnJonrr EcoNoimc CoMMInrE 36, 40-45 (March 12,
1973).
184. 6 Cal. 3d 227, 235, 490 P.2d 1148, 1153, 98 Cal. Rptr. 460, 465 (1971).
185. 406 U.S. 535 (1972). In its argument to the court, the State Department
of Social Welfare relied heavily on HEW's approval of the Texas plan, as demon-
strated in HEW's amicus brief to the United States Supreme Court in Jefferson. See
6 Cal. 3d at 232, 490 P.2d at 1151, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
186. The maximum grant and the percentage reduction systems are two methods
by which states allocate limited welfare funds among eligible recipients. Under both
systems, the state first calculates the monetary needs of persons eligible for categorical
assistance and then compares the total need figure with the amount budgeted by the
state for each of its categorical aid programs. In states that use the maximum grant
system a specified maximum is then imposed on any single grant payment in order
to stay within the budget. In states that use the percentage reduction system, a per-
centage reduction factor is applied to all xecipients of a particular categorical aid
program so that each recipient or recipient group has the same percentage of its need
met by the assistance payment.
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tice Rehnquist wrote for a bare majority in upholding the Texas
method of subtracting a recipient's nonexempt income from the ratably
reduced grant payment, rather than requiring Texas to subtract the
income from the standard of need and then apply its percentage re-
duction factor. 187  Certiorari was subsequently granted in Villa,' s
and the case was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light
of Jefferson. Compelled by the contrary interpretation of the con-
trolling federal leglislation by the United States Supreme Court, the
California Supreme Court reversed its decision. 189
Relative Responsibility Laws Under the Act
In Swoap v. Superior Court,190 an opinion authored by Justice
Sullivan, the court upheld recently revised relative responsibility pro-
visions, the predecessors of which had been unanimously struck down
by the court less than two years earlier in County of San Mateo v.
Boss.19' In so doing, the court also all but overruled its previous
"landmark" decision in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner. 92
187. In Jefferson, the Court also upheld against an equal protection challenge the
decision of the Texas legislature to limit spending on the AFDC program to seventy-
five percent of determined need while providing one-hundred percent funding for its
other categorical aid programs. 406 U.S. 535, 545-51 (1972).
188. 406 U.S. 965 (1972).
189. 7 Cal. 3d 926, 500 P.2d 887, 103 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1972).
190. 10 Cal. 3d 490, 516 P.2d 840, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1973).
191. 3 Cal. 3d 962, 479 P.2d 654, 92 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1971).
192. 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964), cert. granted, 379
U.S. 811 (1964), vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 194 (1965), reiterated solely on
state grounds, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965). Kirchner
had received narrow construction in court of appeals decisions. Thus, in In re Dudley
(in which the County of Alameda successfully sought partial reimbursement from a
woman for the care of her mentally deficient adult daughter) the court analyzed the
issue as follows: "If Kirchner stands for the proposition that when the state, in the
exercise of its promotion of the general welfare, commits a person either for the pro-
tection of society or for his protection or rehabilitation, or any combination thereof,
it cannot thereafter seek reimbursement except from such person or his estate, that
case is determinative of the matter in issue. On the other hand, if Kirchner is limited
to its facts and does not preclude the state from seeking reimbursement from those
otherwise legally responsible for the care, support and maintenance of the person
treated, inquiry must be directed to a determination of whether or not respondent is
responsible for the support of her adult daughter; and, if so, whether the state has
properly provided for the enforcement of any obligation arising from that responsibil-
ity." 239 Cal. App. 2d at 407, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 794 (citation omitted), quoted with
approval by the Swoap majority, 10 Cal. 3d at 496-97, 516 P.2d at 844-45, 111 Cal.
Rptr. at 140-41. The Dudley court concluded that Kirchner "does not expressly ...
restrict the right to recoupment to the inmate, or his estate, but states that the cost
may not arbitrarily be charged to one class of persons. Such an arbitrary charge
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In Boss, the court had reaffirmed the broad principles established
in Kirchner by holding that the adult child of a recipient of aid under
the Old Age Security Law (OAS) could not constitutionally be com-
pelled to make reimbursement to the state under Welfare and In-
stitutions Code sections 12100 and 12101 if he was under a pre-
existing obligation to support his parent by common law duty or
statute.193  The precise holding in Boss rested on the conclusion
that, although Civil Code section 206 created a support obligation
upon children of "poor" parents, the defendant's mother's eligibility
for OAS benefits was predicated on a more encompassing "need"
standard. Because she owned a home valued at $31,800, she was
not so "poor" as to obligate her son for her support under Civil Code
section 206, although ownership of this property did not prevent her
from qualifying as needy for purposes of the OAS laws.19 4
In observing that the mother had assets, however, the Boss court
expressly rejected the argument suggested by language in Kirchner
that the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions resulted from
the failure of those provisions "to vest . . . [in] the servient relatives
any right of control over, or to recoup from, the assets of the patient."195
The Boss court concluded that "the classification of responsible rela-
tives [in Kirchner] lacked a rational basis. . . . [T]he absence of
recoupment provisions in this case is irrelevant to the basic task of
determining whether the classification of adult children is a rational
one."'191 While thus clarifying the reach of Kirchner, the court nev-
ertheless emphasized the Kirchner court's recognition that "the costs
of such care could, consistently with equal protection, be charged to
those persons who had a preexisting duty to support the recipient of
the care."197  Because the particular defendant in Boss was determined
not to have such a preexisting duty under Civil Code section 206, the
results when liability is imposed on a daughter because of blood relationship alone
without regard for the means of the parent patient . .. [or on] a relative who except
for the arbitrary statute was in no other manner liable for the support of the patient."
239 Cal. App. 2d at 411-12, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 797, quoted by the Swoap majority, 10
Cal. 3d at 497, 516 P.2d at 844, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
193. 3 Cal. 3d at 967-68, 479 P.2d at 656-57, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 297-98 (1971).
194. Id. at 971, 479 P.2d at 659-60, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300.
195. Id. at 972, 479 P.2d at 660, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 300, quoting Department of
Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d at 722, 388 P.2d at 724, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 492,
cert. granted, 379 U.S. 811 (1964), vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 194 (1965),
reiterated solely on state grounds, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1965).
196. 3 Cal. 3d at 972, 479 P.2d at 660, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
197. Id. at 967, 479 P.2d at 657, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
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court expressly reserved the question of the constitutionality of the
duty of support for the "poor" created by Civil Code section 206, in-
timating in a footnote that it might well be susceptible to an equal
protection challenge.
198
The relative responsibility laws involved in Boss required only
small contributions from adult children, a compromise position between
an outright ban upon relative responsibility, as had already been
achieved in the programs for the blind and disabled, and more onerous
relative responsibility provisions, such as were contained in the state
AFDC program. As part of the Welfare Reform Act, the Legislature,
"[a]t the insistence of the [Reagan] Administration,"' 99 had given the
department authority to increase drastically the required schedule of
payments from adult children of OAS recipients.2 0 0  In apparent re-
sponse to the court's decision in Boss, Civil Code section 206 was also
amended to require adult children to support parents "in need" and
to provide that a "person who is receiving aid to the aged shall be
deemed to be a person in need.
'"2 1
Thus, in Swoap, the court was squarely faced with the previously
postponed constitutional question: was the legislature constitutionally
empowered to pass laws creating peculiar liability of relatives of the
needy. Given the long history of relative responsibility provisions
and the political questions that they raised and further given the ab-
sence of support from the United States Supreme Court for the broad
constitutional principle enunciated in Kirchner, the California Supreme
Court not surprisingly accepted the legislature's power to determine
this issue and retreated to the position of limiting its prior decisions
in Kirchner and Boss to their facts.2
0 2
198. Id. at 971 n.8, 479 P.2d at 660, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
199. The Welfare Reform Act of 1971, supra note 152 at 489.
200. The complete delegation of authority to the department was an apparent at-
tempt by the legislature to disassociate itself from any responsibility for the law that
it had passed. See The Welfare Reform Act of 1971, supra note 152, at 489.
201. 1971 Cal. Stats., ch. 578, § 3 at 1137 (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE § 206 (West
Supp. 1977)).
202. 10 Cal. 3d at 502, 516 P.2d at 848, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The decision
holding the provision constitutional was based on the historical duty of children to
support their poor parents, which dated back to the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601.
The majority concluded that "[t]his duty existed prior to, and independent of, any
duties arising out of the state assistance to the aged." Id. at 504, 516 P.2d at 849,
111 Cal. Rptr. at 145. In an accompanying footnote, the court specifically overruled
Boss to the extent that "it is inconsistent with our views and holding herein" and held
that the liability was constitutionally imposed on all children regardless of whether
they would be liable for the support of their aged parents under Cal. Civ. Code § 206
(West Supp. 1977). Id. at 502 n.10, 516 P.2d at 848, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
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Justice Tobriner, joined by Justice Mosk, wrote a blistering dissent,
which was perhaps his most eloquent and articulate statement on the
obligation of the state with regard to public assistance programs and
the manner in which they are to be financed. Unhampered by the
constraints of a majority opinion, he presented his own analysis of the
constitutional issues involved and attacked the statutes in question
as denying equal protection of the law. He concluded that a denial
of equal protection resulted from the imposition of the cost of public
old age assistance on adult children of the poor when the adult children
would not have been legally responsible for providing such services
if the state had not undertaken its public program. He described
the majority opinion not only as overruling Boss and being irreconcil-
able with Kirchner but also as "a dangerous inroad into basic principles
of individual freedom and minority rights ... ,"203 Justice Tobriner
further stated that the majority opinion "greatly expands the power of
the state to foist general expenses on the shoulders of small classes
of citizens, permitting the majority, by a unilateral decision to provide
certain benefits to some of its citizens, to require a designated minority
to bear expenses for which they would otherwise not be responsible.
* . . [A]cceptance of the majority's new constitutional analysis would
open the door to a wide abuse of majoritarian power."
20 4
In his dissent, Justice Tobriner demonstrated the inconsistency
of Swoap with the dictates of Kirchner. Under the prior decisional
law in California, the state could seek reimbursement from a relative
of a benefited person only when the relative would have been legally
responsible for support even if the state had not undertaken its public
program. 20 5  Although the court had not adjudicated the constitu-
tionality of Civil Code section 206 in Boss, it had held that, at least
where no duty existed under that section, the state could not enforce a
reimbursement obligation against an adult child of a recipient of aid
to the aged. 200 Justice Tobriner observed that the Swoap court could
have held, consistent with Boss, that the state could seek reimburse-
203. Id. at 511, 516 P.2d at 855, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
204. Id. at 512, 516 P.2d at 855, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
205. Id. at 511, 516 P.2d at 855, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
206. Id. at 516-17, 516 P.2d at 858-59, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 154-55. In this regard,
Tobriner noted that there was considerable case law interpreting the scope of former
§ 206's duty of support on the basis of factors such as (1) what demands were made
by the adult child's children (which take precedence over the parent's needs), (2)
what was the total wealth of all of the parent's children, and (3) whether the parent
by ill treatment of the child had lost his right to demand full support from his child.
Id. at 517 n.3, 516 P.2d at 859, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
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ment under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 12100 and 12101
from adult children of OAS recipients but only to the extent that they
were legally liable for the support of their parents under Civil Code
section 206.207
Nevertheless, Justice Tobriner would have gone further. In his
view, Civil Code section 206 was itself unconstitutional.2 08  As the
majority had pointed out, even under the Elizabethan Poor Law, the
legal liability of relatives was designed to indemnify the public and
minimize its costs in relieving the poor.2011  Although the majority
considered this historical record sufficient justification for continuing
to impose the duty, seminal decisions, such as Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation,2 1 0 had demonstrated the inadequacy of judicial inquiry lim-
ited to tradition: "tradition is not evidence of rationality but only
of practice." 2 1  To Justice Tobriner, the historical background dem-
onstrated that the statutory duty of support created by section 206
had never been "independent" of the state's reimbursement provisions
but, on the contrary, was established merely to implement such re-
imbursement and to reduce the state's responsibilities. "Given the
history and purpose of Section 206, it cannot be said that adult chil-
dren would have been legally obligated to support their needy parents
absent the state's decision to provide such aid."
212
Justice Tobriner concluded that singling out adult children of
parents who are poor to bear the burden of old age assistance payments
constituted a denial of equal protection. Relying on Professor ten-
Broek's analysis of the "doubly invidious" history of the family law of
the poor, 213 Justice Tobriner took the further step of equating poverty
as a classifying trait with race, creed, and other suspect classifica-
tions. In his view the decision of the court in Serrano v. Priest214 was
controlling on this issue.
207. Id. at 520, 516 P.2d at 861, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
208. Id. at 521-22, 516 P.2d at 861-62, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 157-58.
209. Id. at 503, 516 P.2d at 849, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 145. See note 202 supra.
210. 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
211. California's Dual System of Family Law, supra, note 12, at 643.
212. 10 Cal. 3d at 521-22, 516 P.2d at 862, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 158 (emphasis in
original). For criticism of Justice Tobriner's review of the history of CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 206 (West Supp. 1977), see The Supreme Court of California 1973-1974, 63 CALIF.
L. REV. 11, 99 (1975).
213. California's Dual System of Family Law, supra note 12, at 644.
214. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 597, 487 P.2d 1241, 1250, 196 Cal. Rptr. 601, 610 (1971).
The declaration of the California Supreme Court in Serrano that wealth was a suspect
classification preceded the United States Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which the high court
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In his Swoap dissent, Justice Tobriner made explicit the views
that were implicit in some of his previous opinions. "The frequently
fortuitous circumstance" 215 of poverty was a burden that the state
had undertaken to alleviate. The arbitrary selection of a private group
to bear a disproportionate share of the public expense was an abuse
of majoritarian power and a denial of equal protection of the law.216
Observing that it is always popular to reduce the general tax burden,
Justice Tobriner asserted that the potential for abuse of majoritarian
power was "particularly hazardous" in the context of relative responsi-
bility laws because "the group singled out to bear a disproportionate
share of the public expenses will frequently be a small minority, often
with no cohesive characteristics that would permit effective political
representation."217
Ironically, although Justice Tobriner's dissent was premised on
his assessment of the "social reality" 218 of the dual system of family
law in California, the majority opinion could also be read as a reflec-
tion of a kind of "social reality:" that of the political consensus evi-
denced by the recent legislative determination to expand the existing
reimbursement requirement of relatives of the poor. In addition, the
high priority placed by the Governor on enacting these new provisions,
which had been specifically worded to circumvent the Boss ruling,
turned Swoap into a direct political challenge from the Governor to
the court. Although a judicial refusal to legitimate this legislation,
either in whole or in part, could have rested on constitutional principles
previously enunciated in Kirchner and reiterated in Boss, the Reagan
administration would certainly have viewed such a ruling as an act
of political war.21 9  Whether the majority was influenced by such
possible political repercussions, it was in any event unprepared to
make a sweeping ruling that the constitution absolutely prohibits the
state from seeking reimbursement for the provision of public assistance
from relatives of indigent recipients. Instead it recognized the power
refused to hold that wealth was a suspect classification in a challenge to Texas' system
for public school finance which combined local property taxes and state funds. When
Serrano was again before the California Supreme Court, the court reaffirmed on state
grounds alone its holding that wealth was a suspect classification and education a
fundamental interest. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976).
215. 10 Cal. 3d at 523, 516 P.2d at 863, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
216. Id. at 518, 525, 516 P.2d at 859, 865, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 155, 161.
217. Id. at 518, 516 P.2d at 859, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
218. Justice Tobriner considers that one role of the judiciary is to accomplish the
"sensitive accommodation of constitutional principles to social reality." Id. at 525, 516
P.2d at 864, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
219. See note 175 & accompanying text supra.
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of the legislature to circumvent the constitutional problems posed in
Kirchner and Boss. The unfortunate result was the abandonment of
the relative responsibility issue to the political maneuvering in which
the executive and legislative branches in Sacramento were then
engaged.
22 0
In Washington, meanwhile, Governor Reagan and others who
pressed for the retention of state control of AFDC programs were
successful in preventing the federalization of AFDC administration
through a national income maintenance program. Congress had, how-
ever, passed a law providing supplementary security income for the
aged, blind, and disabled, '2 ' thereby shifting these categories of
recipients to federally administered programs.-22  The new federal
plan made no provision for recoupment from responsible relatives.
The plan did contemplate, however, that at least half the states
would supplement the program with additional funds. A contribut-
ing state would have the option of administering the additional funds
itself. Nothing would prevent it from including relative responsi-
bility provisions, such as California's, in its supplementary program.
Nevertheless, in 1975 the California legislature finally repealed all
relative responsibility provisions relating to the aged, blind, and
disabled.
2.
220. In October of 1971, the administration, pursuant to the new legislation had
drastically increased the payment schedules then being required of adult children of
OAS recipients. See the schedule reprinted in Swoap v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d
490, 508, 516 P.2d 840, 852, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136, 148 (1973).
By March of 1973 the schedules had been scaled down somewhat, including a
1972 statutorily mandated fifty percent allowance for taxes and expenses of a respon-
sible relative who reached age sixty. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12101 (West 1972).
In 1973, the legislature passed the Burton-Moscone-Bagley Citizens' Income Security
Act for Aged, Blind and Disabled Californians, which consolidated the three programs
in contemplation of pending federal legislation. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 12000-
12401 (West 1972 & Supp. 1977). As a consequence, the recently upheld OAS rel-
ative responsibility provisions were extended to the ATD and AB programs, but the
legislature simultaneously reduced the amounts that could be recovered. Former CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 12350 enacted in 1973, repealed and superceded in 1975. See
note 223 & accompanying text infra.
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383C (1974). Governor Reagan had, ironically, favored
"the separation of the elderly, blind and disabled categories from the present de-
meaning welfare structure and the provision of monthly pension checks for these
groups through an automated system similar to social security." WELFARE REFORM
IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 145, at 14.
222. See Callison, Early Experience under the Supplemental Security Income Pro-
gram, 37 Soc. SEC. BULL. 3, 6 (June 1974).
223. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12350 (West Supp. 1977). In 1976, the legis-
lature also repealed the recoupment provisions applicable to relatives for payments
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Although this result was a moral victory of sorts for Justices
Tobriner and Mosk, it nonetheless left standing the relative responsi-
bility provision for county general assistance 22 and the MARS con-
tribution provision contained in the AFDC program.225  Also, because
the issue was resolved through the political process rather than as a
matter of constitutional principle, relative responsibility provisions
may be reestablished at any time if a majority of the legislature again
finds it politically popular to do so.
This potential reversion is the crux of the problem as seen by
Justice Tobriner. To leave the fate of powerless minorities to the
winds of partisan politics is an abdication of the judiciary's responsi-
bility to protect individual rights. Although the Reagan administra-
tion ultimately failed in its efforts to shift the state's burden to relatives
of public assistance recipients, it did so only after attempting to drag
the court into the fray and to force the court to retreat from the prin-
ciples of equal protection that had been suggested in Kirchner and
Boss.
Subsequent Challenges to the Act and Its Implementation
The problems generated by the Welfare Reform Act were far
from over. Several important cases were in the appellate stage when
Swoap issued. The four major cases in this area decided by the court
in 1974 differed in their thrust from those previously decided; only one
challenged specific provisions of the Act, three others challenged
the implementation of the Act by the Department of Social Welfare.
226
Three of the four decisions were written by Justice Tobriner. Two
involved a bare majority of the court, and although the issues this time
centered on statutory rather than constitutional interpretation, they
marked a personal victory for Justice Tobriner in light of his scathing
dissent in Swoap barely six months earlier.
Conover v. Hall
By far the easiest of the three welfare decisions penned by Justice
Tobriner, and the only one whose central issue was decided on purely
federal grounds, was Conover v. Hall, 227 a class action challenging,
made under the prior law. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12351 (West Supp.
1977).
224. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17300 (West 1954).
225. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11351.5 (West 1954).
226. As of January 1, 1974, the State Department of Social Welfare was renamed
the Department of Benefits.
227. 11 Cal. 3d 842, 523 P.2d 682, 114 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1974).
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as incompatible with the provisions of the controlling federal statute,
the $50.00 fixed standard deduction for work-related expenses con-
tained in the Welfare Reform Act. 228  Under the Social Security Act,
a state must take into consideration "any expenses reasonably attribut-
able to the earning of . . . income"22 in setting the amount of aid
to which a recipient is entitled. Arbitrary limitation of this figure to
a standardized amount of $50.00 was held to conflict with the federal
directive. The task of the California Supreme Court was immensely
simplified by a ruling two months earlier by the United States Supreme
Court in Shea v. Vialpando,8 ° invalidating a virtually identical Colo-
rado welfare provision on the same grounds. Thus, affirmance of the
trial court's invalidation of the statute was unanimous, although Justice
Clark, who had taken the place of Justice Peters, wrote a separate
concurring opinion.
In addition to the substantive issue decided in Conover v. Hall,
the Department of Social Welfare raised the arguments that the su-
perior court had no authority to grant a preliminary injunction against
the challenged state welfare provision or to waive the requirement of
an undertaking.231  These arguments were quickly dismissed,23 2 al-
though the latter question of a court's power to dispense with statutory
bond requirements had never before been decided by the California
Supreme Court. The trial court had granted a preliminary injunction
without requiring plaintiffs to post a bond to cover defendants' po-
228. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11451.6 (West 1954).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1974).
230. 416 U.S. 251 (1974). In Shea the United States Supreme Court read the
Social Security Act requirement of the consideration of "any" reasonable work expenses
as a congressional directive that no limitation apart from reasonableness, could be
placed upon the recognition of expenses attributable to the earning of income. The
Court explained that standardized treatment of employment related expenses results
in a disincentive to seek or retain employment for all recipients whose reasonable work
expenses exceed or would exceed the standard. Any state procedure creating such a
disincentive would be in direct conflict with the congressional goal of encouraging
employment. Id. at 264.
231. 11 Cal. 3d 842, 846, 849-50, 523 P.2d 682, 684, 686-87, 114 Cal. Rptr. 642,
644, 646-47 (1974).
232. Justice Tobriner cited earlier supreme court decisions holding that the statute
prohibiting injunctions against the enforcement of public statutes, CAL. CIv. Pnoc.
CODE § 526 (West 1972), did not apply to injunctions sought to bar the enforcement
of unconstitutional statutes. The court could see no distinction between enjoining
statutes that were unconstitutional and enjoining the instant statute, which was invalid
owing to a failure to comport with controlling federal law. The court also rejected
the department's argument that the preliminary injunction was improperly issued be-
cause there had been no explicit finding of irreparable injury. 11 Cal. 3d at 850, 523
P.2d at 687, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
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tential damages. This requirement would, as a practical matter, have
prohibited a preliminary injunction from being issued, because the
statute in question had been projected to save the state approximately
$12 million annually.233 Justice Tobriner stated that just as California
courts retain common law authority to dispense with court fees despite
the apparent mandatory character of statutes calling for the payment
of such fees, they also retain a common law power to dispense with
"cost bonds" and "damage bonds."23 4
The ruling that the trial court had equitable power to dispense
with the bond requirement seems compelled if welfare recipients are
to have full access to the judicial forum. To hold otherwise would
mean that, although welfare recipients might convince the trial court
that a newly enacted state welfare provision reducing benefits was
unconstitutional, the very magnitude of the resulting deprivation to
welfare recipients would prevent them from obtaining a preliminary
injunction.
In the context of a program that provides beneficiaries with their
very livelihood, the ability to challenge substantive provisions before
they go into effect is of tremendous significance. Even with the avail-
ability of retroactive benefits, the preliminary injunction offers far
greater protection to persons at the subsistence level. Therefore, even
though the resolution of the central issue in Conover had been pre-
determined by the United States Supreme Court, Justice Tobriner
was able to extend the availability of an important procedural device
to welfare recipients seeking to bring meaningful challenges to statutes
and to regulations of questionable validity.
The more difficult and controversial decisions were the companion
cases of Cooper v. Swoap235 and Waits v. Swoap, 2 3 four to three de-
cisions that involved administrative attempts to usurp the legislative
function by ignoring the governing provisions of the Welfare Reform
Act. These cases dealt with the administrative concept of deductible
"noncash economic benefits," a concept that had been rejected by a
unanimous court less than three months earlier in California Welfare
Rights Organization v. Brian.237  In that case, in which Justice To-
briner did not participate, Justice Burke wrote the opinion for the
court holding that the governing statutes could not reasonably be
233. Id. at 852 n.7, 523 P.2d at 688, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
234. Id. at 851-52, 523 P.2d at 687-88, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 647-48.
235. 11 Cal. 3d 856, 524 P.2d 97, 115 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974).
236. 11 Cal. 3d 887, 524 P.2d 117, 115 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974).
237. 11 Cal. 3d 237, 520 P.2d 970, 113 Cal. Rptr. 154, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022
(1974).
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interpreted to authorize a welfare regulation that reduced AFDC
grants to expectant mothers on the rationale that the value of a preg-
nant woman's body represented deductible "income" to her fetus.
The court summarized the issue in Brian as follows:
The regulation before us attempts to assess the value to an unborn
child of the comforts he receives in his mother's womb. We think
that, in the absence of express federal or state provisions on the
subject, the instant regulation stretches the existing statutory con-
cept of "income" or "resources" beyond the probable intent under-
lying those terms.
23 8
The court reasoned that although HEW regulations permitted rather
than required AFDC payments to pregnant mothers on behalf of their
unborn children, 23 9 California had a longstanding administrative policy
of interpreting "needy children" to include a fetus.240  Because the
Welfare Reform Act was silent on the subject, the court deemed the
longstanding administrative policy to be "approved by the Legislature
and representative of existing state law."241 The department, relying
solely upon federal and state provisions authorizing a grant reduction
by the amount of nonexempt "income" or "resources" available to the
AFDC recipient, had promulgated a regulation purporting to measure
"in kind income" received by the fetus representing the value of the
"resources" provided by the mother in the form of reduced needs for
food, clothing, and shelter. This ingenious concept could claim no
authorization from the California legislature, except from the general
statutory provision, left unchanged by the Welfare Reform Act of
1971, defining "income" to include "the value of currently used re-
sources."2 42  The court concluded that "the Legislature in using the
238. Id. at 240, 520 P.2d at 972, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 156. In an article in the
California Journal in October of 1971, when the law first went into effect, it was noted
that the State Senate had charged the Welfare Department with violation of the
Welfare Reform Act by, inter alia, contemplating the cutting off of welfare aid to ex-
pectant mothers who were contended to be eligible for assistance from the date of
conception. The author of the article noted that "[t]his charge has provoked strong
denials from department officials and increased efforts to bar release of regulations
which are under study but which have not been approved by the director." 2 CAL.
J. 273 (1971).
239. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court held that fetuses were not
included within the definition of children in the governing provisions of the Social Se-
curity Act but left open the question whether HEW otherwise had power to authorize
matching grants to states choosing to include fetuses within their programs. Burns v.
Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975).
240. 11 Cal. 3d at 241, 520 P.2d at 972, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
241. Id. at 243, 520 P.2d at 974, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
242. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11008 (West 1972) (current version at CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 11008 (West Supp. 1977).
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general terms 'income' and 'resources' [was unlikely to have] intended
those terms to be employed to exclude or reduce the AFDC grant to
unborn children."248 The court was at pains to point out, however,
that nothing prevented the legislature from reconsidering "the question
whether, from a standpoint of policy, the grant to pregnant mothers
should be terminated or reduced."
244
After the unanimous decision in Brian, similar conclusions would
seem to have been compelled in Cooper and Waits, which likewise
involved unauthorized "in kind income" concepts. The result was
not so straightforward. Although Brian had rested on the principle
of prohibiting administrative usurpation of legislative power, the una-
nimity of the court was heavily influenced by the subject matter. The
three justices who switched sides three months after Brian to dissent
in Cooper and Waits apparently did so because the contrived reduc-
tion of AFDC grants to pregnant AFDC recipients had offended their
sensibilities, but the regulations involved in Cooper and Waits com-
ported with their own sense of reason. Only with difficulty can the
conflicting positions taken by those justices in these three related cases
be reconciled with any consistent legal principles. Yet, it is just such
a principled approach that Justice Tobriner has continually worked
to maintain in the area of public assistance laws, despite persistent
attempts to politicize the court's decisions in this area.
Cooper v. Swoap
The regulations at issue in both Cooper v. Swoap and Waits v.
Swoap were struck down on the ground that, without statutory author-
ization, they improperly reduced AFDC grants on the rationale that
shared housing represented deductible "income." These regulations
were also invalidated on the ground that deductions for presumed,
rather than actual, income were in conflict with the governing provi-
sions of the Social Security Act. Cooper involved a regulation that
provided that, in situations in which one or more recipients of AFDC
aid resided in the same household with one or more recipients of adult
aid,245 "'if the recipients housing and utilities allowance exceeds his
243. 11 Cal. 3d at 243, 520 P.2d at 974, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
244. Id. The continued validity of federal participation in payments provided
by state programs for fetuses is unclear. See Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975).
See note 258 infra.
245. The regulation at issue referred to the system of adult aid prior to 1974.
When plaintiffs initiated the action, there were three "adult aid" programs in Cali-
fornia: Aid to Totally Disabled (ATD), Aid to the Blind (AB), and Old Age Se-
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share of the actual cost of housing and utilities (including telephone)[,
the excess shall be considered in-kind income and taken into considera-
tion in computing the grant.'-246 The resulting deduction for pur-
ported income generated by this shared living situation in fact did
not measure "income" at all but the department's approximation of
the reduced need resulting from pooled living arrangements. The
problem faced by the department, however, was that the express
terms of section 11450 of the Welfare Reform Act of 1971 required
the payment of a flat grant to recipient groups, depending on the size
of the AFDC family, without regard to need. This flat grant system
removed the authority previously delegated to the state Department
of Welfare to determine need allowances.
What the department was attempting to do through regulations
such as those at issue in Brian, Cooper, and Waits was to transmute
its determination that certain AFDC recipients had less need than
other AFDC recipients into a finding that such "reduced need" was
deductible income. As Justice Tobriner observed in a footnote to
his Cooper opinion, however, whether the economic benefits of shared
housing could conceivably be characterized as "income" was not at
issue.1 The question before the court, as in Brian, was far more
limited: whether the legislature intended such "noncash economic
benefits" to be considered as "income" deductible from the flat grant,
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 11008. Not only
was there no indication that the legislature had intended to expand
the definition of income, upon enactment of the Welfare Reform Act
of 1971,248 to include such benefits, there was every indication that
it had not. Justice Tobriner reviewed the legislative history of the
Welfare Reform Act and observed that the very regulation at issue
in Cooper had been proposed by the administration during negotiation
of the Act and had been decisively rejected by the legislature.2 49  He
derived additional support for the finding that the regulation was in-
compatible with the legislation from the report of the subsequently
curity (OAS). As of January 1, 1974, these programs were superseded by the fed-
erally administered SSI program and the supplemental state program. See text ac-
companying notes 221-22 supra.
246. 11 Cal. 3d at 860 n.2, 524 P.2d at 99, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
247. Id. at 868 n.16, 524 P.2d at 104, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
248. Prior to the enactment of the 1971 Welfare Reform Act, section 11008 had
never been interpreted as broadly as the department argued and section 11008 was re-
enacted in 1971 without amendment. 11 Cal. 3d at 868, 524 P.2d at 104, 115 Cal.
Rptr. at 8.
249. 11 Cal. 3d at 863-64 n.11, 524 P.2d at 101-02, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 5-6.
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formed legislative subcommittee, which had specifically repudiated the
regulation as an attempt "to- usurp the Legislature's policy-making
authority."250
In addition to finding that the regulation had been rejected in
principle by the legislature, Justice Tobriner found it to be in direct
conflict with former Welfare and Institutions Code section 11006,251
which expressly mandated that "aid granted [to adult aid recipients]
shall not be construed as income to any person other than the re-
cipient."252  By designating a portion of an adult aid recipient's hous-
ing benefits as "income" to AFDC recipients residing in the same
household, the regulation contravened the statutory prohibition. Fi-
nally, going further than Justice Burke had done in Brian, Justice
Tobriner concluded that even if the department had the power to
define income to include "noncash economic benefits" never before
considered income, it did not have the power to impute income based
on arbitrary administrative allowance figures valuing these benefits.
Rather, this procedure violated the governing provisions of the Social
Security Act, which stated that only actual available income, and not
presumed income, could be deducted from the recipient's grant.
253
Justice Tobriner concluded his opinion with the observation that
the department's attempt to justify its contrived and tortured concept
of "income" reminded him of the "fanciful world of Lewis Carroll
250. Id. at 865 n.12, 524 P.2d at 102, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 6, quoting CAL. SENATE-
ASSEMBLY SuBcoNmnTT-E ON ImPLErENTATION oF WELFARE REFORM, REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE 20-21 (March 17, 1972). The Subcommittee's retroactive condemna-
tion of the regulation would not in any way prohibit the court from reaching a dif-
ferent conclusion. Nonetheless, when viewed in conjunction with the refusal of the leg-
islature to enact a similar provision into law just months earlier and with the contrary
provisions of CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11006 (West 1972) (current version at CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 11006 (West Supp. 1977)), and the new statutory prohibition
against deducting from AFDC grants for reduced need, as opposed to actual receipt
of income, it provides overwhelming evidence that the concept had indeed been re-
jected by the legislature.
251. 11 Cal. 3d at 869-70, 524 P.2d at 105, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
252. CAL. WrELL. & INST. CODE § 11006 (West 1972) (current version at CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 11006 (West Supp. 1977)).
253. 11 Cal. 3d at 870, 524 P.2d at 105-06, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 9-10, citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a) (7). Although Justice Burke dissented in Cooper, he too was troubled by
the sometimes absurd results achieved by the application of the department's allow-
ance figures as a substitute for the determination of actual income received by an
individual recipient. Id. at 876-77, 524 P.2d at 110, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 14 (Burke,
J., dissenting). He would have therefore upheld the regulation on its face but re-
stricted its application. Id. at 879, 524 P.2d at 112, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 16 (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
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[where] the inhabitants could turn fact into fiction and fiction into
fact by mere ipse dixit."254  He then somberly warned:
'Through the Looking-Glass' dealt with a fictional child. The
tragedy of the instant case is that the department's regulation,
born of a fictional "allowance" construct, has brought all-too-real
hardships to very real children. An administration of the welfare
program that discards statutory mandate to reduce relief to the
indigent young cannot be sustained. A society that sacrifices the
health and well-being of its young upon the false altar of economy
endangers its own future, and, indeed, its own survival.255
The dissenting opinion of Justice Burke, joined by Justices Clark
and McComb, was premised on the broad discretion granted by the
legislature to establish regulations "not in conflict with the law."
256
In his view, the department had made a reasonable attempt to measure
income, although in some instances the allowance figures would pro-
duce anomolous results and therefore could not be applied across the
board.25 7  His views, and those expressed by Justice Clark2 5 8 in a
separate dissenting opinion, are reminiscent of the court's rationale
for upholding the relative responsibility laws attacked in Swoap just
months earlier.
What can explain the seemingly opposite positions taken by the
court during such a short period? Apparently, the "income to the
fetus" concept in Brian had offended the justices' sensibilities. Cooper
254. Id. at 872, 524 P.2d at 107, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 873, 524 P.2d at 108, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 12 (Burke, J., dissenting). The
majority's answer to Burke's objections was a reference to the checks and balances of
our democratic system; a legislature passes laws, an administrative body implements
laws by appropriate regulations and the courts sit in review to determine whether the
administrative agency is in fact complying with legislative mandate. Thus, it is
the court's interpretation of the legislature's definition of income that is controlling
and not that of the Department of Social Welfare. Id. at 864, 524 P.2d at 102, 115
Cal. Rptr. at 6.
257. See note 253 supra.
258. Justice Clark characterized the issue as deductibility of "free housing." Id.
at 879-80, 524 P.2d at 112, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 16 (Clark, J., dissenting). The majority
did not quarrel with the characterization of free housing as deductible in kind income
as contemplated by CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11009.1 (West 1972). Rather, it
pointed out that a shared living arrangement did not constitute partially free housing
any more than would an inexpensive independent living arrangement. It is merely
one method of economizing on housing, allowing recipients to allocate more of their
limited grant to other less flexible needs. The regulation at issue impermissibly char-
acterized this savings as "deductible income."
In fact, the regulation did not even consistently determine income from shared
living arrangements. Only if the recipient's pro rata share of housing and utilities
exceeded an administrative "allowance" was income deemed generated. 11 Cal. 3d
at 863, 871 n.19, 524 P.2d at 101, 106-07, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 5, 10-11. Thus, the
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can be distinguished from Swoap because it involved a specific statu-
tory protection for recipients of aid to the totally disabled that pre-
vented construction of the grant as income to anyone else. The
resurrected AFDC housing allowance had been found to be just an
administrative attempt to construe ATD grant money as "income" to
AFDC recipients owing to the "shared living arrangement," in direct
conflict with Welfare and Institutions Code section 11006.
Waits, on the other hand, had neither of these aspects. Although
it also involved an imputation of in kind income from a shared living
arrangement, the AFDC recipients affected were not children with a
mother who was also disabled and therefore eligible for ATD, as in
Cooper, but children who resided with "non-needy" relatives. Thus
the Waits regulation embodied a form of relative responsibility similar
to the statutory provisions upheld six months earlier in Swoap. Why,
then, was Justice Tobriner able to convince a majority to condemn
the Waits regulation? The difference would appear to be that, al-
though a majority of the court felt compelled to dilute the principles
it had established in Kirchner and Boss in the face of strong legislative
opposition, deference to a coequal branch on a controversial issue is
far different from acquiescence in an administrative body's arrogation
of legislative power.
Waits v. Swoap
The challenged regulation in Waits provided that "non-needy"
relatives would be conclusively presumed to have contributed income
in the form of housing and utility benefits to AFDC children in their
care to the extent that the department allowance for housing and utili-
ties exceeded any increased costs attributable to the child's presence
in the home. Relying upon the same analysis used in Cooper, Justice
Tobriner found that the characterization of shared housing as income
to the recipient was completely at odds with the flat grant system
effected by the Welfare Reform Act of 1971. The concept involved
more expensive the shared living arrangement, the less income. In Cooper, for ex-
ample, the department determined that the children derived $31.00 of income by reason
of their mother's payment of $14.00 as her pro rata share of housing expenses. This
resulted from subtracting the children's $70.00 pro rata share of housing (% of $84.00)
from the unauthorized administrative housing allowance for five children ($101.00).
If the Cooper family had instead paid $60.00 for housing expenses, the formula would
find that the children "received" $50.00 in income generated from the mother's pro
rata contribution of $10.00I On the other hand, if housing expenses for the entire
Cooper family were $122.00 or more, application of the administrative formula would
result in a determination that no income had been generated by the shared living, ar-
rangement.
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in the Waits regulation had apparently not been considered by the
legislature prior to passage of the Act, but, as was true of the regulation
in Cooper, the legislative subcommittee that oversaw implementation
of the Act had specifically repudiated the regulation at issue in
Waits.259  Justice Tobriner likewise found the regulation to be "simply
another variation on the department's 'noncash economic benefit'
theme," which attempted to circumvent the flat grant mandated by
the legislature by transmuting its determination of the recipient's re-
duced needs into deductible income..2 60  He pointed out that shared
housing had "never been considered deductible 'income' throughout
the entire history of California welfare programs, and nothing in the
1971 Welfare legislation indicated that the Legislature intended to
change that approach."
2 61
Although thus far it paralleled Cooper and Brian, Waits rested
on a second rationale that had been unsuccessfully argued in Swoap.
The departmental regulation conclusively presumed a gift of housing
by nonneedy relatives to the AFDC children in their care, in effect
creating a duty of partial support premised on the acceptance of
AFDC children in their homes. The relatives covered by the regu-
lations262 were persons who otherwise had no legal duty to support the
children whom they took into their homes. Justice Tobriner distin-
guished the situation presented by a relative who donates free housing
and utilities to an AFDC recipient from a relative who is either un-
willing or unable to donate any such "income." This issue had been
aptly framed by a federal court in invalidating a similar administrative
practice:
[W]hether the relationship is one of stepfather, relative, or total
stranger, [t]he test is simply whether the substitute parent is re-
quired by state law to furnish the support; if he is not, then the
state may not, solely by virtue of the substitute parent relationship,
assume a contribution to the child's support by some presumption




Thus, like the MARS provisions invalidated by the United States
Supreme Court in King v. Smith264 and Lewis v. Martin,26 5 the instant
259. See note 250 supra.
260. Waits v. Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 887, 892, 524 P.2d 117, 119, 115 Cal. Rptr. 21,
23 (1974).
261. Id. at 893, 524 P.2d at 120, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
262. The class of relatives affected by the regulation are grandparents, uncles, aunts
or other close relatives other than parents. See former State Dep't of Social Welfare,
Reg. 44-115.6 (1971).
263. Jenkins v. Georges, 312 F. Supp. 289, 292 (W.D. Pa. 1969) (emphasis added).
264. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). See text accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
265. 397 U.S. 552 (1970). See text accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
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regulation impermissibly assumed the availability of income to the
AFDC children that they might well not have received.2 66
In addition, not only did the regulation deduct for housing that
the relative involved might be unable to supply, but also it as-
signed value to the housing that had nothing to do with the actual
housing situation in which the children found themselves. Thus, even
if living accommodations were cramped and an AFDC child slept in
the living room, the regulation presumed that "a spare room" had
been provided and assigned a value of $67 to the gift of a "spare
room."
267
The consequence of such a regulation was that some AFDC grants
were indeed reduced by foisting part of the children's expenses onto
their relatives. Because the duty of partial support lasted only as
long as the AFDC child stayed in the home, the regulation produced
growing economic pressure on marginal families, such as the Waits,
to send the children to a foster home, which would have cost the state
more and provided the children with a less desirable living arrange-
ment.268  Just as the statute considered in Conover v. Hall had
thwarted the basic congressional policy of encouraging welfare re-
cipients to become self-sustaining through employment, the instant
regulation thwarted another basic purpose of the AFDC program
- "encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes
or in the homes of relatives."20 9
As in the Cooper opinion, Justice Tobriner closed with an evoca-
tive summation of the administrative tactics:
In promulgating this unauthorized measure, the department is in
reality gambling that close relatives acting as caretakers will feel
a moral obligation to keep an AFDC child even though the child
can no longer contribute the AFDC grant which the Legislature
266. The plaintiffs in Waits exemplified the all-too-frequent inaccuracy of the pre-
sumption. Mr. and Mrs. Waits had six AFDC children in their care; three were
grandchildren and three great-grandchildren. The couple's combined total income
from social security benefits and a pension was less than $5,000 annually, but they
were "nonneedy" because they did not personally qualify for any categorical aid
programs. Because of the substantial reduction in the children's flat grant brought
about by the presumed gift of housing, the family was no longer getting enough to
eat and was unable to clothe the children properly. Affidavits to this effect accom-
panied the plaintiffs' complaint. 11 Cal. 3d at 891 n.2, 524 P.2d at 118-19, 115 Cal.
Rptr. at 22-23.
267. Id. at 894, 524 P.2d at 121, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
268. Id. at 895-96 n.8, 524 P.2d at 122, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 26, citing testimony of
Mrs. Mary Charles of the Santa Clara County Department of Social Services at the
Assembly Welfare Committee Hearing on Foster Care 46-47 (Sept. 7, 1972).
269. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1971); see CAL. WELr. & INsT. CODE § 11205 (West 1972).
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guaranteed. If the department "wins" its gamble, the state will
save money but only at the expense of depriving children of es-
sential need items and subjecting their generous relatives to un-
warranted hardships. If the department loses its gamble, as is
all too possible, the children will lose the close family environment
sought to be achieved by the act and the state will have to pay
the higher cost of foster care.
In essence, the department has so enmeshed itself in fictitious
and misleading labels for the sake of reducing welfare costs that
it has obfuscated the purpose of the underlying statute: the
preservation, so far as possible, of the family unit, and the more
fundamental purpose of the preservation of the health of the
state's children, the potential leaders of tomorrow."'
A dissent by Justice Burke, joined by Justice McComb, and a
separate dissent by Justice Clark, substantially reiterated their posi-
tions in Cooper but added as support an HEW letter approving the
regulations at issue as being in conformance with federal law2'i
Particularly noteworthy was Justice Burke's acceptance of the regu-
lation's premise that AFDC children "commonly reside in a spare,
unused room in the home." In his view, any exception was accom-
modated by a corollary provision for reimbursement for out-of-pocket
expenses proved to have been incurred as a result of the child's pres-
ence in the home.2 72  Justice Tobriner answered this argument in a
footnote, observing that "[wihile the 'credit' given for actual out-of-
pocket expenses would in some cases ameliorate the harshness of the
regulation's effect, such credit would in no way cure the regulation's
fundamental defects."2 73
In later cases, the court confirmed its intention to continue to
play an active role in the protection of welfare recipients' rights.
Thus, in 1976 it ruled that the independent judgment standard of
review, trial de novo, must be applied in administrative mandamus
270. 11 Cal. 3d at 895-96, 524 P.2d at 121-22, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26 (footnote
omitted).
271. Id. at 898 n.1, 524 P.2d at 123, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (Burke, J., dissenting).
Although the court had rejected HEW's position in Villa, HEW's views were generally
deemed subject to considerable deference by the court. Of course, the primary ground
for invalidating the regulations at issue in Waits was that they conflicted with a state
law, an issue upon which HEW obviously had not passed.
272. Id. at 897, 899, 524 P.2d at 122, 124, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 26, 28.
273. Id. at 894-95 n.7, 524 P.2d at 121, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 25. Justice Tobriner's
position is ironically illustrated by the very example cited by Justice Burke in dissent.
If "the spare room presumption" proved invalid and the family were forced to move
to larger quarters to accommodate AFDC children, the logical result would be that
the presumed "income" from the gift of a spare room would no longer be deemed
applicable. Instead, the regulation would still be applied to produce a cut in the
recipient's grant owing to the value assigned to the nonexistent spare room.
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actions challenging the termination of welfare assistance. 27 4  Stating
the views of six members of the court, Justice Richardson concluded
that "the right to continued welfare benefits, for purposes of judicial
review of welfare decisions, is both 'fundamental' and 'vested' .... "275
Soon thereafter, the court ruled five to two that an applicant who
successfully challenges an administrative denial of benefits may be
awarded retroactive benefits and prejudgment interest2 76 as well as
the statutory award of attorneys' fees and court costs.
2 77
Recognition of the rights of welfare recipients, however, has been
tempered by recognition of the limitations of judicial enforcement
mechanisms. This institutional constraint is demonstrated in the re-
cent decision of In re Sand s,278 in which the court denied a writ of
habeas corpus filed by a woman convicted of obtaining AFDC aid by
means of false statements. The petitioner argued that the conviction
had to be overturned because the state failed to follow statutory re-
quirements that it seek restitution prior to instituting a criminal fraud
action against her.279  The court assumed for the sake of argument
that seeking restitution was a mandatory statutory requirement, rather
than merely a directive, and that a criminal prosecution would there-
fore be barred because of the state's failure to follow required pro-
cedures. Nevertheless, in an opinion by Justice Tobriner, expressing
the unanimous view of the court, it was held that failure of the state
to comply with the statutory requirements did not constitute a funda-
mental defect in the criminal proceeding, which would have exposed
the conviction to collateral attack on habeas corpus, because restitution
was not a defense to the charged crime.
The holding is limited to the ruling that for purposes of post-
conviction habeas corpus proceedings, no fundamental jurisdictional
defect had been stated by the alleged failure of the state to seek re-
imbursement. In dicta, Justice Tobriner indicated: "It may be . . .
that construing the restitution requirement as mandatory is desirable
to ensure that in future cases prosecutors will seek restitution before
filing criminal complaints, thus furthering the legislative goals of
274. Harlow v. Carleson, 16 Cal. 3d 731, 548 P.2d 698, 129 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1976).
See the companion case of LeBlanc v. Swoap, 16 Cal. 3d 741, 548 P.2d 70,4, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 304 (1976).
275. 16 Cal. 3d at 734, 548 P.2d at 700, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
276. Tripp v. Swoap, 17 Cal. 3d 671, 552 P.2d 749, 131 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1976).
Justice Sullivan wrote the opinion. Justice Clark, joined by Justice McComb, dissented.
277. Id.; see CAL. WEU'. & INST. CODE § 10962 (West 1972).
278. 18 Cal. 3d 851, 558 P.2d 863, 135 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1977).
279. CAL. WErx. & INST. CODE § 11483 (West 1972) (current version at CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 13200 (West 73B Supp. 1977)).
September 19771
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
safeguarding public funds and protecting the interest of dependent
children."280
Here again, he employed dicta as a vehicle to convey a message
on the proper implementation of welfare laws. Prosecutors have thus
been forewarned that they could face possible reversal of future wel-
fare fraud convictions if they do not demand restitution prior to in-
stituting criminal proceedings. In this manner he again reminds the
executive branch that although its position is upheld in the instant
case, statutory public assistance provisions are not to be ignored or
followed at whim. If necessary, the judiciary will act to ensure that
the legislative objective is accomplished.
Conclusion
Although some commentators extol the "passive virtues" of the
court,281 Justice Tobriner is an unabashed judicial activist.2 82  He has
fought to establish the obligation of society to provide public assistance
to its indigent and to ensure that public assistance programs are car-
ried out in an evenhanded manner and with proper regard for the
human dignity of public assistance recipients and their families.
The late Professor Bickel described the court as a countermajori-
tarian force in an otherwise democratic society that, for that reason,
must exercise its powers with restraint.283 Justice Tobriner recognizes
the countermajoritarian position of the court and welcomes the oppor-
tunity to prevent abuse of majoritarian power. His criticism echoes
that of Charles Reich: "The great error of the public interest state
is that it assumes an identity between the public interest and the
interest of the majority. . . . [T]he government should gain no
power as against constitutional limitations by reason of its role as
a dispenser of wealth. ''284
In enacting the Welfare Reform Act, with some provisions of
questionable validity, the Democratic leadership in the legislature
knowingly passed the buck to the courts.28 5  The determination of
280. 18 Cal. 3d at 858-59, 558 P.2d at 867, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 781 (emphasis
added).
281. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Bickel, Fore-
ward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961).
282. See Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 512 P.2d 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201
(1973); Swoap v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 490, 516 P.2d 840, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136
(1973). See text accompanying notes 97-113 & 190-220 supra.
283. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 40, 51-58 (1961).
284. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 774 (1964).
285. See note 174 supra.
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the validity of legislative and administrative actions, however, is not
just the province of the courts. It is the province also of every citizen
called upon to execute questionable directives; it is the province of
administrators and prosecutors in faithfully carrying out their statu-
tory duties and the province of conscientious legislators, 286 who in
the first instance must pass upon the constitutionality of action that
they propose to take.
Only because the other branches failed to undertake their con-
stitutional and statutory responsibilities was the judiciary confronted
with the legal problems posed by the cases discussed herein. Only
because there are justices like Justice Tobriner, whose principles do
not yield in the face of strong political pressure, have the poor gained
recognition in the courts as more than mere political pawns.
In fact with the recent reassertion of wealth as a suspect classifi-
cation under the state constitution,2 8 7 the California Supreme Court
may soon declare: "'[T]he mere state of being without funds is a
neutral fact - constitutionally an irrelevance' [and] classifications
based on poverty and handicap are measured by equal protection
standards of constitutional purpose and proper classification .... "288
More than eighty years ago in Plessy v. Ferguson, the first Justice
Harlan, dissenting, said that the constitution is color-blind.289 It was
not until Brown v. Board of Education,290 in which the court held
that classifications based on race are suspect, that his dissent was
vindicated. If Justice Tobriner's conception of wealth as a suspect
classification is accepted in the near future, he may have the satisfac-
tion, denied Justice Harlan in Plessy, of seeing his dissent in Swoap
vindicated in his own lifetime. Much of the groundwork has already
been laid. The proximity of the goal attests in large measure to the
zeal with which Justice Tobriner has sought to protect the constitu-
tional and statutory rights of welfare recipients and demonstrates the
strength of his underlying conviction that he is merely articulating
the duty of society to its indigent and, more broadly, the duty of
society to itself to safeguard its own future.
286. See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Implemen-
tation, 27 ST~A. L. REv. 585 (1975).
287. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976).
288. California's Dual System of Family Law, supra note 12, at 682. The adop-
tion of wealth as a suspect classification does not automatically extend to Professor
tenBroek's position. See the differing analyses of the majority and dissent in Swoap
v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 490, 516 P.2d 840, 111 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973).
289. 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
290. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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